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Whenever I transcend the limits of my own life span 
and begin to reflect on this past, judging it, and this 
future, forming projects of the will, thinking ceases 
to be a politically marginal activity. 
 -Hannah Arendt 
 
 
 
 
History is the subject of a structure whose site is not 
homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the 
presence of the now. 
-Walter Benjamin 
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Abstract 
Through analyzing textbooks, educational pamphlets, and the correspondence of the 
Committee of Public Instruction, I show that prejudices became the object of critique in the 
era of the Enlightenment and were a continuing topic of political concern during the French 
Revolution. During the French Revolution, prejudices represented any form of counter-
revolutionary tendencies which were presumed to be a result of heteronomous reason and 
thus posed an epistemological threat to the revolutionary and Enlightenment projects. 
Correspondents to the Committee adopted revolutionary language to discuss their concerns 
and so legitimatized the threat of prejudices. The textbook authors believed that moral 
education, supplemented by appeals to the students’ sensibilities, would be the most effective 
way to purge prejudices from society. By focusing on the interaction of prominent and 
everyday revolutionaries within educational discourse, I showed that ordinary people were 
involved in a process of defining and attacking prejudices rather than simply consenting to a 
definition imposed from above. Prejudices functioned as a derogatory term used to dismiss 
others’ ideas on a philosophical premise so as to avoid the necessity of engaging with them. 
As both their adoption and rejection allowed for a refusal to communicate, the discourse of 
prejudices therefore occupied an ambivalent space in revolutionary politics.  
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Better to illuminate than merely to shine, to deliver to others 
contemplated truths then to merely contemplate. 
-Thomas Aquinas 
 
 
What is learning but a glorius form of play? 
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Introduction: Has the King Already Been Judged? 
In his speech on December 3, 1792 denouncing the attempt to try the King, 
Maximilien Robespierre said: 
Such is the natural dominion of habit that we regard the most arbitrary conventions, 
sometimes indeed the most defective institutions, as absolute measures of truth or 
falsehood, justice or injustice. It does not even occur to us that most are inevitably 
still connected with the prejudices [préjugés1] on which despotism fed us.2 
 
Robespierre argued that the fact that Louis Capet was a king preemptively made him a 
traitor, even before his attempt to flee to Austria and raise an army against the Revolution. In 
this quote, Robespierre linked the possibility of a formal trial to an acceptance of the 
prejudices of despotism. By trying the King, the Convention would be admitting the 
possibility of his innocence. To Robespierre, this assumption represented a significant 
misunderstanding of the inherent tyrannical nature of the monarchy. Therefore, he rejected 
the value systems as tainted by the prejudices of despotism. His dismissal of prejudices was 
shared by other speakers at the trial. One speaker begged the Convention “not to pass down 
to posterity the deplorable memory of our prejudices.”3 Louis Antoine de Saint-
Just passionately argued that “the ruin of prejudices had shaken tyranny” and allowed for the 
French people to win their liberty.4 Jeanbon Saint-André urged his fellow deputies not to 
surrender now: “braving the menaces of tyranny, we have combatted prejudices with 
relentless zeal, and we see, with a joy as life and pure, the sun of Liberty.”5 These repeated 
                                                
1 Throughout the text, préjugé will be translated as prejudice. Within the context of the French Revolution, it 
captures the negative connotations associated with thoughts from the Ancien Régime. The second chapter will 
examine the philosophical definitions of this word, which other translators have used.  
2 Maximilien Robespierre. “On the Trial of the King,” Virtue and Terror. John Howe, Trans. London: Verso, 
2007: 58-9. 
3 J. Madival and E. Laurent, et. al., Eds. Archives parlementaires de 1789 à 1860: recueil complet des débats 
législatifs & politiques des Chambres françaises. Paris: Librairie administrative de P. Dupont, 1862-, Tome 54, 
22. https://frda.stanford.edu/fr 
4 Archives parlementaires, Tome 55, 703. 
5 Archives parlementaires, Tome 54, 57. 
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statements implied that prejudices could prevent the deputies from properly meting out 
justice while the rejection of prejudices proved that they and, by extension, the French people 
deserved liberty. If the legislators were not, in the words of Jean-Jacques Bréard, “dominated 
by prejudices and fanaticism” and thus enthralled with the King’s majesty, they could 
actually attend to the matter of his treason.6 In all of these claims, prejudices were an obstacle 
to revolutionary justice because they interfered with rational judgment of a new age.  
By perpetuating lingering influences of the Ancien Régime, prejudices imperiled the 
integrity of autonomous and hence revolutionary judgment. Instead of believing that the 
method of a trial could undo the influence of prejudices, Robespierre argued for a new kind 
of revolutionary judgment: “People do not judge in the same way as courts of law; they do 
not hand down sentences, they throw thunderbolts.”7 Other deputies, however, criticized the 
abandonment of the slow, methodical aspects of judgment. Judging before the examination of 
evidence, they argued, still qualified as prejudice, even if revolutionary prejudice. As Dan 
Edelstein showed, many of the deputies turned to natural law as the basis of their judgment, 
and even Robespierre cited it as proof that judgment had already been attained.8 The king 
was ultimately executed for treason on January 21, 1793 after a trial.  
Nevertheless, the decision did not reflect a consensus over standards of judgment for 
ordinary life, and these confused standards were in many respects the effects of the 
dissolution of a unified sovereignty. The revolutionaries recognized that simply executing the 
king or declaring a republic would not completely destroy the monarchy. In legal matters, the 
                                                
6 Archives parlementaires, Tome 55, 378. 
7 Robespierre, “On the Trial of the King,” Virtue and Terror, 59. One is reminded here of the image of Zeus and 
the possibility of influence by the Greek and Roman gods and not merely their governmental systems, but such 
a connection has not been proved. 
8 Dan Edelstein. The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009: 146-157. 
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Constitution could be supplemented or even replaced by natural law.9 In more mundane 
matters, however, there still appeared to be a lack of consensus by which people could judge. 
Claude Lefort posits that society constantly seeks unity, yet the realization of this unity 
would lead to the destruction of democracy.10 In his book Disenchantment of the World, 
Marcel Gauchet argues that societies attempt to abandon heteronomy yet never fully attain 
their goal of autonomy.11 Heteronomy is action influenced or directed by outside forces – in 
this instance, the monarchy, but also potentially imaginary forces, such as the divine. By 
seeking self-governance, the society is, in a sense, reifying itself by making the people, rather 
than a representation of the people, sovereign.  
However, modern societies must balance the autonomy of the whole with the 
autonomy of the individual. In this quest for autonomy, individuals seek to escape “the 
collective totality,” but first the state must “create individual independence while continuing 
to presuppose the primacy of the social order.”12 In the Trial of the King, Robespierre and 
other deputies argued that prejudices limited their ability to be autonomous. If they did not 
recognize and reject these prejudices, the deputies would have been unable to completely 
envision a social order without the King. Therefore, both the King and, even more 
importantly, the prejudices associated with monarchical rule had to be abandoned. By 
destroying the monarchy, the revolutionaries opened the possibility of self-governance and 
henceforth had to balance the autonomy of both France and the French people. This dialectic 
between individual autonomy and state authority was central to politics of the French 
                                                
9 Edelstein, Terror of Natural Right.  
10 “Democracy inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be 
said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will 
remain latent.” Claude Lefort. The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy and 
Totalitarianism. John B. Thompson, Ed. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986: 304. 
11 Marcel Gauchet. The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion. Oscar Burge, Trans. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
12 Gauchet, Disenchantment of the World, 58, 65. 
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Revolution, as the revolutionaries sought a standard which would prevent the reliance upon 
prejudices.  
Because political authority relies upon being able to delineate not only acceptable but 
also available modes of discourse, this quest was linguistic and discursive.13 In the case of 
the French Revolution, statesmen formed the conception of the new order by distinguishing it 
linguistically from the Ancien Regime, a concept that they contributed to creating.14 One of 
the ways that they were able to achieve this was by using the term préjugé to symbolize all of 
the negative aspects of the Ancien Régime. This decision drew upon the Enlightenment 
tradition of using prejudice to signify mental and cultural tendencies which were not in 
accordance with the ideal of autonomous reason. The ubiquitous use of the term prejudice 
during both the Enlightenment and the Revolution linked the philosophical and political 
projects together, thus validating the various revolutionary ideals regardless of revolutionary 
faithfulness to specific Enlightenment ideas.  
 
Prejudices as Anti-Judgments 
While meanings for the term prejudice varied with the stage of the Revolution,15 one 
constant remained: whatever else they might have been, prejudices were not judgments. 
Specifically, prejudices had not undergone the rigorous mental process of judgment. 
Therefore, as we attempt to understand the philosophical definition of prejudices, it is helpful 
to examine them in correlation to their antithesis, judgment. For these purposes, the thought 
                                                
13 Keith Michael Baker. Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth-
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990: 4-5. Alessandro Duranti. Linguistic Anthropology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 61-4. 
14 Baker, Inventing the French Revolution, 4. 
15 This is particularly true of religion: it is one of the main signified meanings of the term préjugé during the 
Reign of Terror, but near the beginning and end, it was not as central. Similarly, the monarchy did not become 
important to the discussion of prejudices until after the King attempted to flee. 
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of Immanuel Kant proves particularly instructive. According to Jonathan Israel, Kant was the 
only Enlightenment philosopher who was able to somewhat successfully attempt to “bridg[e] 
the gulf between Radical democratic Enlightenment and moderate antidemocratic 
Enlightenment.”16 In his 1790 Critique of Judgment, Kant mused on the problem that 
prejudice posed for the Enlightenment and how judgment, as a function of reason, could 
combat that danger. He stated that: “A propensity to a passive reason, and hence to a 
heteronomy of reason is called prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is superstition, 
which consists in thinking of nature as not subject to rules which the understanding through 
its own essential law lays down as the basis of nature.” 17 Hence, prejudice was linked to 
heteronomy, a rejection of the ability to govern oneself rationally. The connection between 
individual and governmental autonomy meant that prejudices were not just an individual 
issue of autonomy, but a political one as well.  
As they are acceptances of others’ thoughts, prejudices are a refusal to think 
independently. This unthinking causes the individual to deviate from what their own reason 
would decide, thus causing the individual to disagree with themselves. Kant continued: 
“Liberation from superstition is called enlightenment […] although liberation from prejudices 
generally may also be called enlightenment.”18 Prejudices are inherently counter to the 
project of the Enlightenment, which is the development of autonomous reason. Through the 
amalgamation of individuals’ autonomy, the society as a whole would be able to move 
towards a stage of higher autonomy, as in Gauchet’s work.  
                                                
16 Jonathan Israel. A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 
Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010: 12. 
17 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgment: Including the First Introduction. Werner S. Pluhar, Trans. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987 [1790]: 161. 
18 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 161. 
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In this critique, Kant spells out the relationship between judgment and reason; 
judgment is “a mediating link between understanding and reason.”19 Through analyzing the 
relationship between the particular and the universal, judgment uses the faculties of reason in 
order to achieve understanding. In order to avoid being prejudiced, judgments must be 
individually formed, yet with no influence from personal interests.20 With the notion of 
universal standards, judgments require “the assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded 
as an example of a universal rule.”21 Therefore, judgments must be communicable.22 One of 
the main examples of this is the sensus communis, or common sense, which is “a sense 
shared (by all of us), i.e., a power to judge that in reflection takes into account (a priori), in 
our thought, of everyone else’s way of presenting (something), in order as it were to compare 
our judgment with human reason in general.”23 In this comparison, individuals can identify 
differences between their judgment and the judgments of others in order to locate any 
potential biases. However, when we refer to the common sense, “we compare our judgment 
not so much with the actual as with the merely possible judgments of others.”24 The faculty 
of judgment requires the ability to imagine how others might judge. The goal is not 
consensus in lieu of independent judgment, “which would be precisely the sociological effect 
of a servile imitation,”25 but rather the understanding that, were everyone to judge properly, 
consensus would be inevitable. 
Although judgment was an individual act of reasoning, reflective judgments, which 
had to identify a universal, relied on collective norms as a criterion of judgment. This 
                                                
19 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 16. 
20 Michel Chaouli. “A Surfeit in Thinking: Kant’s Aesthetic Ideas.” The Yearbook of Comparative Literature, 
Vol. 57: 62. 
21 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 85. 
22 Paul Ricoeur. The Just. David Pellauer, Trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000: 96. 
23 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 160. 
24 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 160. 
25 Ricoeur. The Just, 98. 
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understanding of judgment came more from the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
specifically his concept of the general will which required obedience and yet derived from 
the individuals. This insistence on consensus is representative of what Pierre Rosanvallon 
terms “revolutionary monism.” In this philosophical understanding, the revolutionaries 
turned to totalizing concepts which needed to make judgment both autonomous and yet form 
a collective agreement.26 In a paradoxical way, the collected judgment of individuals within a 
society had to be coherent in order for a society to be capable of political autonomy. If the 
individual judgments were too disparate, then the government would be incapable of having 
a coherent policy. This dynamic represented the balance needed within a representative 
government, in which people were citizens and yet subject to the laws passed by their 
representatives. Gauchet argues that in trying to form this relationship, however, “power and 
society ultimately became indistinguishable, forming the horizon of modern politics.”27 In 
the Encyclopedie articles on natural rights and tolerance, Diderot and Romilly argued that 
judgment was formed in dialogue with the general will.28 Partially foreshadowing Kant’s 
reliance on common sense, Diderot and Romilly argued that individuals had to refer to a 
force like Rousseau’s general will in order to know the social norms that would serve as the 
universal in each judgment. Therefore, to ignore one’s judgment was to disobey the general 
will, and “the essence of crime is the intention to act directly against our judgment.”29 The 
general will thus demanded obedience both socially and individually. Even public opinion, 
which was supposed to be a purely rational and voluntary consensus-making process, was 
                                                
26 C.f. François Furet. Revolutionary France, 1770-1880. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992. 
27 Gauchet, Disenchantment of the World, 174. 
28 Denis Diderot. “Natural Rights.” The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation 
Project. Translated by Stephen J. Gendzier. Ann Arbor: Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 
2009. Originally published as "Droit naturel," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et 
des métiers, 5:115–116 (Paris, 1755). 
29 Romilly. “Tolerance” The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project. 
Translated by Stephen J. Gendzier. Ann Arbor: Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 2009. 
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frequently referred to as an authority and was thus reified so that it began to obscure the 
reality of multiplicity of opinions. However, the rationality of public opinion was questioned 
during the Revolution, as Charles Walton argues that “Robespierre recognized that public 
opinion was still fallible, a fact he attributed to persistent prejudices.”30 If individuals were 
still influenced by prejudices, then any judgment that referred to the society could be 
perverted into counter-revolutionary conclusions. For these reasons, neither public opinion, 
nor the general will, nor even the previously discussed natural law could provide sufficient 
protection from the peril which prejudices posed to the Revolution.  
Recent scholarship on the French Revolution has attempted to move beyond the 
authoritative forces of the general will and public opinion. Instead, they show how these 
issues were negotiated and altered by the revolutionaries to fit specific needs. While 
Edelstein’s work highlights a new aspect of revolutionary discourse, he uses this discovery to 
argue that during the French Revolution, “political debates did not pitch defenders of rival 
value systems against each other (a ‘pluralist’ scenario) but opposed supporters of mutually 
exclusive interpretations of revolution.”31 In this understanding, Edelstein shows why the 
revolutionaries had such a difficult time accepting the legitimacy of political disagreement. 
In his books Becoming a Revolutionary and The Coming of the Terror,32 Timothy Tackett 
argues against searching for ideological causes for revolutionary decisions; he turns instead 
towards understanding the collective psychology through extensive use of diaries and letters. 
Marisa Linton argues that while revolutionary politics were heavily influenced through the 
                                                
30 Charles Walton. Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution: The Culture of Calumny and the Problem 
of Free Speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 111. 
31 Dan Edelstein. “Do We Want a Revolution without Revolution? Reflections on Political Authority,” French 
Historical Studies 35:2 (2012): 288. 
32 Timothy Tackett. Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. The Coming 
of the Terror. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. 
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discourse of virtue, they were ultimately decided by personal friendships, which held such 
weight that destroying them during the Terror was an indisputable sign of devotion of the 
Republic.33 Other scholars have turned their attention to aspects of the Revolution that have 
been taken for granted. David Andress focuses on the revolutionary civil wars and argues 
that they should be given a central place in revolutionary history.34 Rebecca Spang 
deconstructs the financial policies of the Revolution to show that the failure of the 
assignants, the new revolutionary paper money, was representative of a lack of trust in the 
new government.35 All of these scholars articulate rebuttals to the notion that the Terror was 
inevitable but rather that it was a result of individuals’ collective choices. 
 
Prejudices in French Revolutionary Education 
Rather than seeking to explain what led to the Terror, my work analyzes how 
individuals interacted with the language of revolutionary politics in order to influence 
educational policy. Through analyzing textbooks, educational pamphlets, and the 
correspondence of the Committee of Public Instruction, I show that prejudices were viewed 
as an obstacle to progress during the Enlightenment and were a continuing topic of concern 
during the French Revolution. The first chapter traces the development of this discourse of 
prejudices throughout the Enlightenment. By focusing on the discourse of prejudices, I show 
that the later revolutionaries drew upon philosophical traditions to argue for a specifically 
political goal. The connotations of this word were so well understood that they frequently 
                                                
33 Marisa Linton. Choosing Terror: Virtue, Friendship, and Authenticity in the French Revolution. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
34 David Andress. The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France. New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 2006. 
35 Rebecca L. Spang. Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2015. 
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required little explanation, but this linguistic flexibility allowed dissidents to use it in order to 
get governmental attention. Chapter two draws on Tackett and Andress by examining letters 
sent to the Committee of Public Instruction in order to understand how France outside of 
Paris reacted to the educational plans. Some of these authors referenced the continual 
fighting and the sense that their well-being was being ignored by the Parisian revolutionaries. 
From Spang, I attempted to show how the process of building an education system was 
hampered by suspicions between legislators and members of the public that the other was 
unable to escape the influences of prejudices. This lack of trust, which contributed to the 
financial crisis, crippled the revolutionary plans for public instruction. In chapters three and 
four, I illustrate how this discourse was central in official discussions of education and that 
morality and emotions were proposed as the crucial techniques to evolve past prejudices. 
During the French Revolution, prejudices represented any form of counter-
revolutionary tendencies which were presumed to be a result of heteronomous reason and 
thus were seen as posing an epistemological threat to the revolutionary and Enlightenment 
projects. Hans-Georg Gadamer claims that “the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment 
is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which deprives tradition of its powers.”36 In 
accordance with Gadamer, chapter one shows that the rejection of tradition as a legitimate 
source of knowledge problematized prejudices. Instead of representing collective wisdom of 
the ages, they represented an unwillingness or inability to independently think in a Cartesian 
manner. Enlightenment philosophers therefore had the obligation to disabuse their readers of 
their prejudices by showing how the current religious and political traditions were neither 
rational nor the only option.  
                                                
36 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. New York: Seabury Press, 1975: 239-240. 
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Due to their uncritical perpetuation of tradition, prejudices posed a threat to the 
revolutionary project of creating a new society. The term préjugé came to stand for all 
lingering remnants of the Ancien Régime, and it symbolized the fear of counter-revolutionary 
sympathies. Prejudices ignored the existence of the Revolution and the Republic and 
influenced individuals to act as if the Ancien Régime was still in existence, in direct defiance 
of Robespierre’s statement that “Louis was king and the Republic is founded; the great 
question which occupies you is decided by these words alone.”37 The revolutionaries feared 
that the irrationality inherent within prejudices would lead individuals to unthinkingly reject 
the new republic in favor of the corrupt, but traditional monarchy. As such, they framed 
prejudices as a matter of public safety, and they spent a considerable amount of time 
discussing them in the legislature and in Committees. The revolution’s sweeping legislation 
stemmed from a fear that the monarchy could continue to influence individuals’ thoughts and 
actions through prejudices. Although the revolutionary government developed methods to 
punish the enactment of prejudices, they turned to education as a way to preserve the purity 
of the fledgling Republic. In many ways, education was the keystone to the perfectibility of 
society. Through education, individuals would become citizens and must be prepared to act 
as such. As Antonio Gramsci phrases it, the adoption of democratic forms of government 
“must mean that every ‘citizen’ can ‘govern’ and that society places him, even if only 
abstractly, in a general condition to achieve this.”38 In a republic, education’s goal is to 
prepare all individuals for their rights and duties as citizens and, in doing so, had to begin by 
eradicating prejudices.  
                                                
37 Robespierre, “On the Trial of the King,” Virtue and Terror, 57. 
38 Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Eds and 
Trans. New York: International Publishers, 1971: 40. I am retaining the gendered language because the 
Revolution granted suffrage only to males. 
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 Not all revolutionaries used the term préjugé, and as the revolutionaries were a 
diverse intellectual group, it would be 
wrong to imply that they all shared an 
identical definition of prejudice. 
Nevertheless, as chapters two through four 
show, prejudice was a dominant concern in 
revolutionary discourse throughout the 
Revolution that transcended partisan lines.39 
Just as prejudice was anathema to the Enlightenment project, revolutionaries, by virtue of 
having rejected the Ancien Regime, also had to reject prejudices, even if only nominally. 
Although some of the textbook authors were prominent Girondins, Jacobins, such as 
Robespierre and Saint-Just, also referred to prejudices in these ways. Furthermore, as I show 
in chapter two, the discourse of prejudices was used by people without orthodox 
revolutionary beliefs. Like federalism or aristocracy, the word préjugé gained a connotation 
of automatically denouncing, of labelling that belief or action as inherently unrevolutionary. 
This connotation meant that while it was undoubtedly a legitimate threat to the revolutionary 
project, it could also be used in strategic ways, as a method of perfunctorily dismissing ideas. 
This dual meaning contributes to the diversity of people who were able to use the term in 
meaningful ways. In order to encapsulate the overarching uses of the term, I occasionally 
refer to “the revolutionaries” although this might occasionally imply more of a unified vision 
than actually existed. 
                                                
39 Chart from Archives parlementaires. 1313 results. For reference, liberté had 2980 results; fédéralisme, 330, 
and aristocratie 1162. 
Results from the French Revolution Parliamentary 
Archives search for préjugé. 
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Calling every aspect of society into doubt was a tendency of some strands of 
revolutionary thought. Wherever these revolutionaries found prejudice, they sought to 
replace it with a more rational system. This attention to detail led to significant linguistic 
reform as well as the more known projects, such as the festivals or the adoption of the metric 
system.40 While these rationalizing endeavors appear to have roots in the thought of the 
Enlightenment, they were not merely philosophical exercises. They were necessitated by the 
perception, justified by the nation-wide correspondence to the Committee, that prejudices 
posed a significant threat to public safety by contaminating the new republic. Both the 
textbook authors and correspondents perceived prejudices as predictors of counter-
revolutionary revolt because they represented the Ancien Régime. Dispelling atavistic ideas 
was therefore just as important as fighting in the Vendée or against the Austrian invasion, 
although teachers were not paid as frequently or as well as soldiers. The authors of these 
letters saw the well-known delay of the educational plans and the financial distress of 
educational institutions as contributing to the continuation of prejudices, though they did not 
always rely on the term préjugé to signify their concerns.  
In the midst of this relative chaos, individuals, often heavily involved in revolutionary 
politics, published textbooks to be used in primary schools and addressed the threat that 
prejudices posed to the public safety. The textbooks analyzed here offered potential solutions 
to the danger of prejudices because the authors and Committee members knew that the 
textbook would have to stand, at least temporarily, in the place of proper training, 
surveillance, or payment for teachers. They therefore advocated for moral education in which 
the virtue of the republic and revolution would be explained through historical examples or 
                                                
40 Mona Ozouf. Festivals and the French Revolution. Alan Sheridan, Trans. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991. 
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by using art. Art was central to the proposed curriculum because of an established association 
between political and aesthetic judgments.41 Building on this commensurability, the textbook 
authors hoped to encourage the development of civic judgment through exposure to beauty. 
The beautiful was supposed to inspire virtuous sentiments as an integral part of judgment. 
The textbook authors used art and passionate appeals to heighten the relevance of their civic 
lessons. 
By prioritizing morality and sensibility, these authors sought to inculcate the process 
of judgment. Gadamer argues that Enlightenment philosophers agreed that “[i]t is only by 
having a basis, a methodological justification (and not the fact that it may actually be correct) 
that gives judgment its dignity.”42 However, the revolutionaries were also concerned with the 
correctness of judgment’s outcome. Their vision and philosophical basis of politics 
demanded autonomy of thought, but their political circumstances, which were constantly 
under constant threat, led to a desire for a political judgment that could be simultaneously 
authoritative and autonomous. The adoption of rationality, through the rejection of 
prejudices, was seen as a possible solution to this dilemma; however, it contributed to a fear 
of dissent. The King, prejudices, and counter-revolutionaries threatened the purity of the 
revolutionary project; education, then, would become for the revolutionaries a purifying 
process and a defensive strategy. 
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Chapter I: “Strangers to Reason”: Philosophical Attitudes towards Prejudice 
To think and to be fully alive are the same. 
-Hannah Arendt 
 
 In a 1770 essay, Paul Henri Dietrich d’Holbach claimed that “prejudices are the true 
causes of hardships.”43 He lambasted the French people as “strangers to reason, dupes of 
ignorance” and the selfishness of the aristocracy, claiming that these “oppressors of the earth 
have profited from their [the people’s] religious prejudices.”44 Like other philosophes, he 
decried superstition, ignorance, and error and called for a radical movement towards reason 
and knowledge. Through denouncing the economic, political, and religious systems, he used 
language strikingly similar to the revolutionary authors at the end of the century.45 This 
resemblance is epitomized by the Revolution’s continuing view of prejudices as a significant 
social and political problem. Still, the influence of Enlightenment thought on the French 
revolutionaries remains uncertain.46 Nevertheless, Roger Chartier maintains that 
“‘philosophical’ books, whatever their intent, produced a veritable ‘ideological erosion’ that 
may have made the revolutionary rupture inevitable.”47 By examining the role of prejudices 
in maintaining the status quo, d’Holbach and his philosophical contemporaries contributed to 
this process of erosion. 
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The Enlightenment project rejected authority and tradition as legitimate sources of 
knowledge. Through this rejection, they began a quest to make reason purely autonomous. 
Enlightenment philosophers dismissed heteronomous beliefs under the (now pejorative) term 
“prejudice.” For the philosophers, prejudices represented a stubborn, erroneous prioritization 
of tradition over reason and an embrace of suspect ways of knowing. In this mission, the 
philosophers defined truth in secular and increasingly non-transcendental ways so that it 
would be accessible through human endeavors. Religious prejudices were therefore doubly 
transgressive because they relied on outside knowledge to explain the unknowable. However, 
prejudices were not limited only to matters of religion but were rather everywhere throughout 
society. In their writings, Enlightenment philosophers aimed to break the hold of these relics 
of the past over the public. 
 
Methodological Doubt 
 Cartesian epistemology (theory of knowledge) was fundamental to Enlightenment 
thought. René Descartes was born in 1596 among the lower French nobility. He was 
educated by the Jesuits and developed an interest in math due to its freedom from doubt.48 In 
his philosophical writings, he sought to create such certainty in other disciplines, arguing that 
“in our search for the direct road towards truth, we should busy ourselves with no object 
about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic 
and Geometry.”49 He criticized deduction for being “erroneously conducted,” while praising 
induction instead, defining it as “the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive 
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mind,” stating that it “springs from the light of reason alone.”50 He intended to establish a 
method to acquiring knowledge which would “reduce involved and obscure propositions step 
by step to those that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive apprehension of all those 
that are absolutely simple, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others by precisely 
similar steps.”51 Once this method was used to prove a firm basis of knowledge, as in his 
famous quote “I think, therefore I am,” the rest of knowledge could be proven logically from 
there.  
If used properly, Descartes’ method would result in being able to judge, “as nothing 
that we construed in this way really deceives us, if we judge it to be probable and never 
affirm it to be true.”52 Therefore, under this conception, Truth is removed from the possibility 
of humankind and is replaced by facts, which can be more certain than Truth because they 
can be examined.53 However, in order to achieve that level of certainty, individuals had to 
systematically discard all existing, heteronomous knowledge. Such knowledge became 
known in the Enlightenment as prejudices. Descartes did not use the term préjugé, but he was 
central to the formation of the understanding that all supposed knowledge should be 
discredited because its formation was not free of doubt.54 Descartes was praised along with 
Francis Bacon for “having a lot of courage to combat prejudices.”55 This continued embrace 
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of radical, methodological doubt is central to the creation of modernity.56 The centrality of 
doubt necessarily implied the rejection of prejudices, which, again, were any form of 
knowledge or belief that had not been critically examined. In the eighteenth century, various 
French philosophers attempted to define prejudices and to expand the conception of them 
from a philosophical problem to a political one. 
 
Defining Prejudice  
In 1690, Antoine Furetière (1619-1688) finished assembling Le dictionnaire 
universel, which in some respects was an anticipation of the encyclopedic projects of the 
eighteenth century.57 By providing systematic definitions and analyzes of virtually every 
aspect of society or topic of knowledge, these projects epitomized the Enlightenment. In his 
dictionary, Furetière defined prejudices as preoccupations with pre-conceived opinions; 
prejudices could be previously formed ideas, but they would always be considered opinions, 
rather than being categorized as previously formed judgments.58 Therefore, Furetière did not 
dispute the notion that prejudices might have been valid for the individual at one point, 
although he still did not concede that this validity was obtained through the rigorous process 
of judgment. Rather, his emphasis was on the fact that prejudices and therefore prejudiced 
individuals could not belong in the present. Their existence represented historical, whether 
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societal or individual, understandings which were not necessarily relevant or accurate within 
the current situation. Furthermore, as individual opinions, they were not trustworthy. 
In the eighteenth century, Denis Diderot (1713-1784) compiled his famous 
Encyclopédie. This work represented the attempt to gather all knowledge together so as to 
contribute to the enlightenment of as many people as possible. In the enlightening process, 
people would learn to abandon their prejudices in favor of accurate, reliable knowledge. 
More importantly, they would no longer need prejudices because they would have started to 
reason autonomously. This reasoning was provided for many other Enlightenment works. For 
instance, Montesquieu listed discouraging prejudices as one of the reasons that he felt 
compelled to write The Spirit of Laws, stating that: “It is not a matter of indifference that the 
people be enlightened. I would consider myself the happiest of mortals if I could make it so 
that men were able to cure themselves of their prejudice.”59 However, the Encyclopédie is 
especially important to discuss because it played a significant role in changing popular 
understandings and beliefs. Many of the other, more pointedly political works of the 
Enlightenment were not as widely read as the Encyclopédie.60 The success of the 
encyclopedic method also influenced later attempts to discredit prejudices. 
In the “Preliminary Discourse of the Editors” of the Encyclopédie, Jean le Rond 
d’Alembert (1717-1783) stated that he and Diderot would know when their work was 
successful because it would be “when prejudices or Sophism will have been driven out [by 
truth].”61 Like Descartes, d’Alembert was a mathematician, and he referred back to 
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mathematical theorems to explain how knowledge could become free of prejudices.62 
d’Alembert praised Descartes’ conception of radical doubt by saying that he “dared at least to 
show in good spirits rattling the yoke of scholasticism, of opinion, of authority, in a word, of 
prejudices.”63 By condensing Descartes’ philosophy into a rejection of prejudices, 
d’Alembert illustrated how prejudice had come to stand for any form of heteronomous and 
hence questionable knowledge.  
Louis de Jaucourt (1704-1779) wrote many of the entries for the Encyclopédie, 
including the ones on prejudices and judgment. Jaucourt defined prejudices as “false 
judgments of the soul.”64 Prejudices were therefore defined negatively: they are not genuine 
judgments. Like Furetière, Jaucourt saw prejudices at best as misguided opinions; unlike 
public opinion, however, individual opinions were not inherently rational. Through 
prejudices, opinions were able to masquerade as judgments, and this disguise contributed to 
their danger. Jaucourt also gave prejudices a moral aspect; not only did they represent an 
intellectual impediment, as in Furetière’s definition, but they were also a moral fault. This 
duality stems in part from judgment’s function as both an intellectual and a moral faculty, 
which will be examined more in-depth later.65 In several other entries, prejudice is paired 
with ignorance, superstition, and fanaticism. Jaucourt recognized the discursive links to these 
other concepts. He called prejudice “the unfortunate fruit of ignorance” and went on to cite 
Bacon’s categorization of them as a “contagion.”66 He distinguished between universal, 
particular, and public forms of prejudice. Universal prejudices are seen through the 
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popularity of superstition; they are fundamental errors that interrupt the proper process of 
prejudice. Particular prejudices, on the other hand, are mental habits, which the individual 
has simply neglected to examine. Public prejudices are ones of convention, “which are the 
apotheosis of error.”67 According to Jaucourt, despotism and fanaticism require prejudices in 
order to gain the consent and support of the people. The disavowal of prejudices is necessary 
for the formation of liberty. 
Voltaire began his entry in his Philosophical Dictionary on prejudices with the 
definitive statement that a “prejudice is an irrational opinion.”68 Prejudices were thus 
immediately discredited within the context of Enlightenment emphasis on rationality. 
Furthermore, like Furetière, Voltaire labelled prejudices opinions, thus dismissing their 
process of formation as lacking rigor. Voltaire did so because of his belief that prejudices 
were not formed by those who possess them: “Thus, throughout the world, all sorts of 
opinions are instilled into children before they are able to use judgment.”69 This statement 
raises interesting questions about the belief in the intellectual faculties of youth and reflects 
the perception that prejudices rely on ignorance.70 Further in the entry, he suggested that the 
current Catholic educational system was encouraging prejudices by devoting an entire 
section to religious prejudices and stating “Out of prejudice you believed the fables with 
which your childhood was deluded.”71 His Philosophical Dictionary was published in 1764, 
near the beginning of debates over educational reform.72 By dismissing the ability of children 
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to independently form conclusions, Voltaire indicted the current education system for 
propagating prejudices instead judgment.  
However, Voltaire did not see this failing as the single cause of all societal problems. 
Unlike the other philosophers, Voltaire recognized the utility of prejudices, stating that some, 
such as moral standards, “are universal and necessary.”73 These prejudices, Voltaire argued, 
“constitute virtue itself”; they could be identified because “they are those ratified by the 
judgment when one is able to reason.”74 He specifically states that love and other sentiments 
were not prejudices, even if the individual cannot provide reasons for their existence and 
influence on their actions. This statement refers back to the eighteenth-century discussion 
about the importance of sentimentality in education. These exceptions were not explicitly 
accepted by other philosophers, but few labelled sentiments or basic morality as prejudices; 
this tension was carried out during the French Revolution’s attempt to adapt education to 
fight prejudices. Voltaire is unique in recognizing that emotions, morality, and prejudices all 
fell under the same philosophical category and yet the former two should not be rejected with 
the latter. Voltaire supported attacks on d’Holbach’s 1770 Essay on Prejudices for being too 
uncompromising.75 Instead, Voltaire’s understanding of the inevitable continuation of 
prejudices anticipated Hannah Arendt’s analysis of them in the twentieth century. Rather 
than rejecting all prejudices on the basis that they were not judgments, Voltaire instead called 
for the rational examination of all prejudices. Through this process, the valid ones would 
become judgments, and then individuals would be able to independently tell the difference 
between vice and virtue.  
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By allowing for confirmation by judgment, Voltaire emphasized the importance of 
the process of judgment formulated by Descartes and accepted during the Enlightenment. 
Furetière defined judgment as a “power of the soul” that has the capacity to “discern the good 
from the bad, the true from the false,”76 hence emphasizing the moral element of judgment. 
Although judgment might be aimed at political or aesthetic questions, it always retained a 
moral element in eighteenth-century France. However, the Enlightenment definitions tended 
to emphasize the process of judgment over its connotations. In his Encyclopédie article on 
judgment, Jaucourt insisted that judgment was not merely knowledge that is acquired solely 
through the senses. Instead, “judgment is […] an operation of the reasonable soul; it is an act 
of research.”77 By focusing on the method, Jaucourt linked his definition back to Descartes’ 
meditations and to more accurate realms of knowledge, such as mathematics. The 
autonomous nature of judgment also distinguished it from inherently heteronomous 
prejudices. As a form of autonomous reason, judgment both exemplified and represented the 
goal of the Enlightenment; prejudices could only be an obstacle to that project. These 
definitions demonstrate how philosophers defined the two in opposition to one another but 
also in relation to Cartesian epistemology.  
 
The Discourse of Prejudices 
 Radical Enlightenment philosophers were not the only ones who denounced 
prejudices. Moderates also used the term to represent the heteronomy of reason and likewise 
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feared the potential damage, but they were conflicted over whether it or the radical attempt to 
uproot it proved the greater threat to society.78 This tension is most evident in regard to 
religious prejudices, as was also the case during the French Revolution.  
Throughout the Enlightenment, the rejection of tradition and thus of heteronomous 
reason was also “fortified by genuine resentment against social injustice.”79 In fact, Baron 
d’Holbach claimed that prejudices were at the root of the people’s oppression, and many 
other philosophers agreed that prejudice was linked to privilege.80 By the early 1770s, 
préjugé was being used to refer to the irrationality of the absolute monarchy.81 However, as 
Peter McPhee states, “the philosophes were not revolutionaries. The extent of their critique 
was limited by what they saw as the ignorance and superstition of the masses.”82 Prejudices 
prevented their critiques from being immediately effective.  
Nevertheless, by linking abstract ideas to social ills, the philosophes were able to 
suggest that the entire society needed to be reformed and purged of prejudices. Discursive 
shifts of this kind were central to understanding Enlightenment thought, as “the philosophes 
effectively linked intellectual and social progress to linguistic advance.”83 Although the 
philosophers were using an old term here, they were endowing it with new significations, 
such as superstition, ignorance, unjustified opinions, which were all notable obstacles to this 
progress. Therefore, prejudice came to automatically mean any idea or behavior which was 
                                                
78 Aurelian Craiutu. A Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748-1830. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012: 145, 156, 192.  
79 Jonathan Israel. A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 
Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010: 35. C.f. Baron Paul-Henri Thiry d’Holbach. Essai sur 
les préjugés ou De l'influence des opinions sur les mœurs et sur le bonheur des hommes, ouvrage contenant 
l'apologie de la philosophie. 1770. 
80 Israel, Revolution of the Mind, 36, 52. 
81 Israel, Revolution of the Mind, 83.  
82 Peter McPhee. Liberty or Death: The French Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016: 30. 
83 Sophia Rosenfeld. A Revolution in Language: The Problem of Signs in Late Eighteenth-Century France. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001: 5. 
30 
 
not aligned with the Enlightenment project. Through this change in meaning, it could be used 
intelligibly in a wide variety of contexts. This discourse over prejudices was continued in the 
educational reform movement of the 1760s and in the French Revolution, where it was 
adapted to represent a threat to revolutionary ideals. 
Through the linkage of the Enlightenment and education, prejudice was primed to 
become not only a philosophical problem but also a political and social one. Through the 
discourse surrounding prejudices, the most obvious solution would have been public 
education. Once freed from prejudices, public education would be able to carry out the 
enlightenment of the common people. Philosophers claimed that individuals must take up the 
burden of self-education if they wanted to be able to reject the prejudices of the Catholic 
education system. While they agreed that people have a responsibility to purify themselves 
for the good of society, they began to suggest that it was unfair to expect them to do so while 
battling all social institutions. They therefore argued that already enlightened men had an 
obligation to make the road smoother for others by reforming the education system – and, 
later, by participating in the Revolution.84 The revolutionaries were able to extend the 
discourse founded by the Enlightenment and to define prejudices in ways specific to the 
revolutionary context. These linguistic claims significantly shaped the political culture of the 
French Revolution, and the rest of this work will focus on the continuing discussion of 
prejudices within the context of revolutionary educational discourse. 
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Chapter II: “Error, Ignorance, and Fanaticism”: Talking about Prejudices  
Human history becomes more and more a race between education and 
catastrophe. 
-H.G. Wells 
 
 In July 1793, a schoolteacher from Nancy wrote to the Committee of Public 
Instruction: “You are dear to all the subjects of the Republic, all of whom have the same 
confidence in your enlightenment, your justice, and your talents.”85 His three pages of 
fulsome praise stood out among the heaps of complaints sent to the Committee in that month 
alone. People from across France directly criticized the Committee for not being proactive or 
quick enough and thereby condemning much of the population to a state of ignorance and 
error. These complaints were situated within a long history of educational reform and in 
relation to the series of plans that the revolutionary governments had promised. The 
correspondents argued that the lack of reform meant that prejudices would continue to reign. 
When the Estates-General was summoned in 1789, villages and cities compiled 
cahiers de doleances, or notebook of grievances that they wanted their representative to 
address. Many of them mentioned education, but there was no nation-wide consensus on how 
to reform the education system. Many accepted Catholic control, but others requested 
government-run schools. The latter group worried about the lack of educational equality and 
standardization of textbooks, as well as the proliferation of superstition in the existing 
system.86 Under the Legislative Assembly, the Committee of Public Instruction argued that 
education must “contribute to the perfectibility of the human spirit,” which required “the 
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maintenance of the principles of the French Constitution” over the remnants of superstition.87 
Thus, from the beginning of the Revolution, the issues of prejudices were connected to the 
need for educational reform.   
Furthermore, an analysis of the correspondence to the Committee of Public 
Instruction under the National Convention from May-July 1793 shows that this concern was 
shared by many members of the society. In the letters examined, the writers did not use the 
term préjugé with as high a frequency as other, typically printed sources. Nevertheless, they 
regularly discussed the issues which préjugé signified, and this discourse became both a sign 
and site of radicalization. By examining how individuals outside of Paris and the Committee 
talked about prejudices, this chapter shows that prejudice was not merely a concern of 
philosophes, but a problem recognized by many individuals during the height of the Terror. 
While there was not a uniform definition of prejudices, most of the correspondents 
recognized the utility of the concept for representing counter-revolutionary ideas. This 
consensus over its broad meaning allowed for it to be used by individuals who disagreed with 
the Jacobin ideology. 
Although the Committee set up a sub-committee to deal with correspondence,88 by 
July 1793, the correspondents were citing previous letters and asking for confirmation that 
the letter had been received, even if the Committee was too busy to address the contents.89 
The writers rarely failed to mention the issue of religious involvement in education. They 
also framed the continual lack of funding as contributing to the sustained levels of prejudice 
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within the rural population. The examined time period included the purge of Girondins, and 
so denunciations of individuals’ lack of zeal for the Revolution carried an additional political 
weight. Overall, the authors gave the Committee the impression that without a regulated and 
surveilled education system, the public would instantly revert to relying on prejudices and 
thus would develop hotbeds of counter-revolutionary resistance. In this way, during the 
French Revolution, education was politicized and framed as the source of stability and 
security for the republic.90 
 
The Pre-Revolutionary Education System 
 Before the French Revolution, education was run by the Catholic Church, especially 
by the Jesuits until their expulsion in 1764. It was only nominally regulated by the monarchy, 
and then only to reinforce the Catholic mission of rooting out heresy.91 The Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation increased attention on literacy, the rates of which doubled during the 
eighteenth century despite persistence of significant regional inequality in education.92 The 
rates of literacy among women rose even more dramatically than those of men, which may be 
linked to the illegal yet de facto co-education of the genders in most rural schools.93 Most 
standardization of curriculum was attained through the efforts of the Jesuits, who focused 
exclusively on Greek and Latin, even banning the use of French within schools until the latter 
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half of the eighteenth century.94 Despite have originally been attacked for allegedly 
promoting religious indoctrination and thus thwarting peace efforts at the end of the wars of 
religion, the Jesuits were later criticized for not linking their moral education to decisions 
within actual society.95 The reformists argued that education needed to directly prepare 
students for the kind of judgments that they would have to make as members of society.  
 In the 1760s, a new educational reform movement began discussing many of the 
issues which would later plague the revolutionaries’ plans for public instruction.96 The 
reformers advocated relaxation of standards of self-discipline and called for a psychological 
understanding of childhood inspired by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in order to 
make education more effective.97 This critique was based on the reformers’ perception that 
the Jesuits were prejudiced against children.98 Furthermore, their other significant critiques, 
notably about the isolation of students from new French literature and ideas, would soon be 
encompassed under the term préjugé.99 However, there was dissent over whether the Jesuit 
schools encouraged obedience to tradition or produced lovers of liberty. In a 1787 pamphlet 
discussing the best ways to induce patriotism under a monarchy, art critic and liberal noble 
Charles-Joseph Mathon de la Cour explicitly blamed the educational system for producing 
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republicans by focusing too much on the sources of ancient Greece and Rome.100 His 
protestations are supported by Lynn Hunt’s argument that lawyers were able to be at the 
forefront of revolutionary politics because their traditional education had prepared them to 
lead: “The order of the speeches, the use of figures and paradigms, and the reliance on 
classical examples can be traced back to schoolboy rhetorical exercises.”101 Although both 
Mathon de la Cour and Hunt showed that the prerevolutionary educational system prepared 
France for republican politics, the revolutionaries nevertheless sought to radically transform 
French education. 
 
Altering Discourse 
Under the National Convention, the legislators attempted to create a didactic politics 
through language. Because it was accessible to all members of the population, focusing on 
language sped up the educational process.102 The old symbols and values were rejected in 
favor of purity. Therefore, the Committee of Public Instruction divided its attention between 
establishing educational institutions for the youth and creating “new symbols, images, and 
public festivals for all citizens”; these combined efforts “constituted a revolutionary 
‘pedagogy’ that would gradually wean the French people from its ignorance and prejudices, 
and inculcate new civic values.”103 They created a plethora of neologisms, such as the word 
instituteur, which meant “the one who would found the new values.”104 These new words 
symbolized and embodied the radical newness and ahistoricism of the Revolution. By 
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creating new terms, the Committee members hoped to separate language from the Ancien 
Régime and therefore limit the influence of prejudices. 
The Committee of Public Instruction was afraid that lack of formal education led to 
an inability to understand “the formal language of France’s laws and constitutions.”105 Hunt 
argues that “the political practice of republicans was fundamentally didactic; republicans had 
to teach the people how to read the new symbolic text of revolution.”106 In addition to the 
festivals and other projects of the Committee of Public Instruction, the Convention advocated 
membership in popular societies, as they “existed to educate every man to [their] political 
responsibilities by discussing the degrees of the national assembly and reading newspapers 
and periodicals.”107 Public discourse was presumed to be a workable substitute for the flawed 
education system, and some of the educational pamphlets played up this notion by 
encouraging popular societies to function as instructive forces. 
Under the Bouquier Law (1793) and the de facto state of deregulation during the 
earlier parts of the Revolution, teachers had no required educational qualifications, but 
“textbooks had to be approved by the Committee of Public Instruction.”108 Although school 
forced the memorization of the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen and the 
Constitution, the textbooks often failed to include commentaries in plain language. Due to 
the lack of formal training, teachers may not have been able to explain the language to their 
students.109 The Jacobin clubs were dissatisfied with this law and called for more regulation 
and higher teacher salaries. Nevertheless, the Jacobins assisted with establishing schools, 
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both through hiring teachers and finding schoolhouses. They also put pressure on local 
administration to enact regulations over discipline.110 According to Michael Kennedy, the 
Jacobin Club of Pau “envisioned the schools as a vehicle to destroy religious prejudices.”111 
To supplement this project, the Jacobin clubs consistently sought to attract youth. In some 
cities, they formed Jacobin youth clubs, which required members to recite the Declaration 
from memory. However, the youth clubs usually merged back into the regular clubs so that 
the youth got proper training in political participation.112 Through exposure to political 
discourse, the youth would get training in republican values and learn the dangers that 
prejudices posed to this political autonomy. 
Adrian O’Connor argues that “the pedagogical ambitions of the Revolution were 
grounded in ideas about the power of information and the nature of communication, about 
the promise and peril of a society in which more people had access to more information (and 
to a wider array of opinions) than ever before.”113 Public instruction needed to prepare the 
public to make sense of this information and to be able to judge it correctly and 
independently. 114 Lessons in reading and writing therefore were shaped to provide the skills 
to access and understand information about the new government and society. Although these 
skills were technical, they were imbued with moral and political lessons both before and 
during the Revolution.115 For O’Connor, this enmeshed relationship is illustrative of how the 
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revolutionary government combined éducation and instruction into public instruction.116 
 
Tainted by Prejudices 
As the legislators worked to address the diverse needs of the nation, they sought to 
create a national, secular education system which would continually enlighten the youth so as 
to prevent internal dangers to the newly established order. Although education had long been 
a religious concern, they made it a secular and public endeavor because they did not want it 
to continue to be tainted by religious prejudices. Paired with the perceived attacks on the 
Catholic Church through the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and the de-Christianization 
efforts, this decision rendered education a site of religious conflict. As the Committee 
members had to struggle with the possibility of allowing religious control of education to 
continue, they had to directly confront the question of whether religion was simply a 
complex of prejudices or if it had redeeming qualities. During the Terror, governmental 
policies leaned towards the former. One correspondent wrote that “the inhabitants of the 
countryside who are less instructed and less enlightened think that one wants to destroy their 
religion,” and he suggested that education should bind the people together, as the divide 
between the Church and State benefited only the Revolution’s enemies.117 
In his monograph Improvement of Humanity, R.R. Palmer argues that the proposed 
educational plans amounted to little more than propaganda.118 Any insistence of 
governmental control of education, however, does not necessarily equate to a propaganda 
machine, especially given the number of debates of what the education system should be like 
or teach. The public had opinions about the various plans for public instruction. For example, 
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public teachers opposed the Talleyrand plan (1790) because it called for the co-education of 
boys and girls.119 Because of the lack of agreement, some politicians claimed that the public 
instruction plans had ambitious noble principles that clashed with public ignorance.120 This 
perception is partially justified by the examined correspondence, which was typically written 
by educated members of society (judges, doctors, teachers, or government officials) who 
bemoaned the fickleness of the public to revolutionary ideals.121 
The present university system had too many vices to allow it to continue to operate 
while waiting for reform. Before the Revolution, universities were incorporated bodies, 
ideally consisting of three faculties: theology, law, and medicine.122 The University of Paris 
was the premier institution of higher learning. They taught exclusively in Latin and were 
generally considered to be “hampered by tradition, inimical to progress and research, and out 
of touch with current developments.”123 Because of their ties to theology, the universities 
“were all swept away” during the Revolution,124 but they were not the only educational 
institutions affected. Because elementary education was not standardized, it is more difficult 
to measure the impact of the Revolution. However, while the Catholic teaching orders were 
not prohibited from teaching, they were viewed suspiciously. This suspicion meant that most 
trained teachers were now hindered from carrying out their duties.125 The rest of this chapter 
analyzes the Committee of Public Instruction’s correspondence located in the National 
Archives of France in order to show how the French population responded to the crises of 
education. 
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Prejudiced against Teachers 
In May 1793, a minor government official in the department of Somme wrote to the 
Committee of Public Instruction that the Roman religion was fomenting insurrection. After 
introducing himself as “perhaps the only true republican in this administrative district,” he 
stated: “It is true that opinion is absolutely free, but it is not possible for true Catholics to 
separate their Savior either from the Church or from schools.”126 He further argued that 
nothing could be more dangerous than “to let them teach their doctrines which run against 
the Constitution.”127 He urged the Committee to begin training teachers and, in the meantime, 
to send a judge to teach the children because they could be trusted to teach against “the 
principles of the old aristocracy.”128 He concluded his letter by stating that there can be no 
worse vice than counter-revolutionary leanings and that he trusted the Committee to act with 
all urgency.    
His tone and word choice were common among correspondents, even ones who held 
opposing views of religion. A vicar from the department of Haute-Loire wrote in July 1793 
to complain that the Church had done an excellent job in education and that it was unfair to 
blame them for “some prejudices” when they had “persuaded many to search for reason and 
public interest.”129 The vicar’s letter and explicit use of the term préjugé shows that the 
discourse of prejudice could be wielded by Catholics and potentially other political 
dissidents. The revolutionary government did not have exclusive control over how this 
discourse was used. In both of these letters, however, the authors suggested that surveillance 
would prove them correct. The vicar argued that the universities, which functioned primarily 
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as seminaries, could reopen and organize free elementary education under the guidelines and 
surveillance of the revolutionary republic. Adopting these measures, he argued, would 
decrease the likelihood of revolt because the people could learn to abandon their prejudices 
under the guidance of the religion which they trusted.  
The letters were not solely concerned with religion. They spoke of the surrounding 
“fire of discord and counter-revolution” and blamed the Committee and the Convention for 
not acting quickly enough.130 Virtually every letter complained of the continual delay of 
educational legislation. In November 1791, a doctor from Vendée criticized the Committee 
for continuing to allow the Academy of Painting to control the governmental commissions of 
artwork. He explicitly stated that this continuing practice perpetuated public prejudices.131 In 
June 1793, the Committee was still receiving letters disparaging the Academy. One author 
claimed that it appeared that the Committee was interested in creating “neither a college nor 
an establishment of public instruction” but apparently preferred to rely on the Academy, even 
though its hierarchy and art shut out the “real revolutionary possibilities of public 
instruction.”132 Although not all of the letters were this harsh, there seemed to be a national 
perception of the Committee having a prejudice against teachers. In this context, however, 
the authors used the term préjudice, not préjugé, thus making a legal accusation. 
 
Questions of Finance 
Although the education system crumbled during the French Revolution, it was not the 
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result of an official dismantling but rather due to the lack of funding. This issue was 
particularly true of the universities, which were deserted because most college-aged men 
joined the military.133 However, it also significantly affected the colleges, which “complained 
repeatedly to the Committee on Public Instruction of failures to receive their due income.”134 
Spang argues that “it was in the course of daily economic life that individuals formed some 
of their strongest political opinions.”135 However, the economy was very unstable during the 
Revolution, which Spang argues resulted less so from the new paper money than “from a 
breakdown in what people could expect of one another.”136 As economic policy changed so 
quickly, it was difficult to put faith in the assignants (paper money of the Revolution), but 
this lack of trust was rooted in feelings towards the Convention. When the teachers and 
administrators wrote to complain about their lack of pay, they were taking part in this 
breakdown of trust. However, in their correspondence to the Committee, these individuals 
had to be careful not to come across as counter-revolutionaries. The letters examined here 
skirted around the issue of the legitimacy of the assignants and pleaded instead for the 
Committee to simply pay them so that they could carry out their duties. 
Although many professors and teachers focused solely on the absence of their 
pensions in their letters to the Committee, others took care to frame it as an issue of public 
safety rather than appearing self-interested. One author explained that he came from a poor 
village, which was trying desperately to maintain their two schools (one for each gender). 
They had even sent a citizen to Paris to buy new republican textbooks because they wanted to 
show their support of the Revolution. However, the teachers had not been paid, and they 
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were therefore “daring to discontinue the use of these textbooks, which will halt the progress 
of humanity.”137 The author begged the Committee to ensure the loyalty of teachers, either 
through promptly beginning to pay pensions or through a thorough surveillance system. 
Complaints of this nature led the Committee to insist upon teacher training.138 Furthermore, 
existing schoolteachers were required to possess a certificat de civisme, or civic certificate, 
and to take an additional oath of loyalty.139 According to David Andress, certificats de 
civisme “were mandatory for all public officials, attesting to their patriotism” and were 
necessary for any form of travel.140 Due to the inability of the government to fund education, 
there was a significant debate over whether the public education system should be 
exclusively public. Some argued that a free market would be able to produce schools at a 
lower cost to society,141 or, at the very least, induce parents to contribute financially to the 
education system rather than relying solely on taxes to fund it.142 However, others questioned 
whether this loss of control would give up ground in the battle against prejudices, as the 
ability or willingness of the family to advocate against prejudices was uncertain. 
The issue of pay continued to haunt the legislators, especially given that the 
Committee was informed that the lack of consistent pay was contributing to a lack of trust in 
the revolutionary government and thus an unwillingness to abandon prejudices. If the 
educational system was being starved into nonexistence, then there would be little cultural 
resources in parts of France to hold back the tides of prejudices. A teacher from Cambrai 
wrote that “[b]efore and since the French Revolution, I have never ceased to combat error, 
                                                
137 AN F/17/1004/C. 
138 Riviale. 
139 Furet and Ozouf, Reading and Writing, 84.   
140 Furthermore, being denied a certificate automatically labelled one as a counter-revolutionary and the 
individual would be arrested and potentially guillotined. Andress, The Terror, 163; 211-2. 
141 Sieyes’s plan of national education would have allowed private schools. Vignery, 60-1. It was more common 
for plans to call for the co-existence of private and public schools than to advocate for only private schools. 
142 Vignery, 19. 
44 
 
ignorance, and fanaticism.”143 He had been proud of his contribution, yet he had never been 
rewarded for it. He was frustrated with the prioritization of bureaucrats and politicians over 
teachers; the former apparently never missed a paycheck, while the latter grew poorer with 
every lesson they taught. Others complained that the government had confiscated church 
property, thus removing the ability of the Church to pay for education, yet gave the ministers 
salaries before the teachers. An author from Rouen complained that the lack of money meant 
that while they had managed to maintain fourteen elementary schools, they were only open to 
men, and none of the girls in the city were able to obtain an education. This gender disparity 
was reflected in the official public instruction plans, which, except for Condorcet’s, gave 
scant attention to the education of girls.144  
Female education also suffered from lax hiring requirements. In hiring, significantly 
more emphasis was placed upon the teacher’s patriotism and morals, which were checked not 
only by the holding of certificat de civisme, but also through surveillance.145 During the 
Revolution, becoming a teacher was an acceptable way for women to express their patriotism 
and was even comparable to men volunteering for the army.146 The gender distinctions 
between acceptable expressions of patriotism were enforced, and, as the Revolution 
progressed, male teachers had to individually justify their decision to teach rather than to 
fight.147 Unfortunately, women were not legally allowed to teach men, and so their 
enthusiasm could not substitute for the dearth of male teachers. Nevertheless, most education 
of the time was forced – due to lack of funding or space – to be co-ed, and so these female 
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teachers may have occasionally taught co-ed classes.148 In localities, their lack of training 
was supposed to be mitigated through the use of government textbooks, 149 which were 
designed to prevent the perpetuation of prejudices.150 During the Terror, women had been 
banned from open political participation, but they were still given the duty of early education 
of future citizens in their potential roles as mothers. An elector of the Estates-General and 
president of the local Jacobin club in the department of Haut-Rhin argued that the neglect of 
women’s education, therefore, was a forfeit of the first line of defense against prejudices. If 
given access to republican instruction, “mothers would steer their children to the holy temple 
of the fatherland” both through their domestic life and by ensuring that their children were 
prepared for formal education.151 However, despite acknowledging the importance of 
republican mothers in preventing the perpetuation of prejudices, the Convention did not 
invest in their education. 
In order to support their claims about being vital for the defense of the nation, school 
administrators professed their willingness to support the Republic through educating former 
soldiers or children of soldiers, but they insisted that the Convention needed to pay their 
tuition.152 However, while specialized institutions, like the School of Mars or schools to teach 
signing to the deaf, managed to obtain funding, most of the existing schools did not, even 
when they were ordered to find room for former soldiers as a reward for “the destruction of 
enemies of the republic.”153 In May 1793, administrators from the College of Equality, which 
had previously been known as Louis-le-Grand, wrote the Committee to demand payment for 
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the tuition of “children of citizens who have taken up arms for the defense of the 
motherland.”154 In their petition, they suggested that schools who were not struggling must 
have had some kind of aristocratic backing, since all governmental support had been shut off. 
This suspicion was echoed in other letters, which claimed that the remnants of the aristocracy 
were able to corrupt entire cities because the people were not being given enough material 
support to resist their aid. Aristocracy was linked to prejudices, as they, like the clergy, had a 
vested interest in the continuation of the Ancien Régime. In these letters, administrators listed 
the various threats to the Revolution – open revolt, aristocratic influence, prejudices – and 
then argued that funding schools would be the quickest way to at least stem the latter two. 
This approach gave prejudices a material quality and cost.  
 
Writing Jacobin 
 In their complaints, the letter writers intended to link the financial distress of the 
education system – and the society as a whole – to the fear of prejudices and counter-
revolution. By showing that the delay benefited the enemies of the Revolution, they sought to 
put pressure on the Committee to commit to a plan. Although they did not always use the 
terminology of the revolutionary elites, many of them were able to enter the discourse of 
revolutionary education. The issues which préjugé symbolized were much more widespread 
than the use of the term itself.155  The authors of these letters thus legitimated the perception 
of heteronomy of reason as a significant political problem.156 In doing so, they showed how 
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educational discourse became a site for linguistic and political radicalization. Learning to use 
the governmental language, even when complaining about overdue paychecks, linked 
individuals around France to the revolutionary plans in Paris and illustrated a widespread 
commitment to the new political regime. Furthermore, they were able to connect the threat of 
prejudices with governmental decisions, such as the lack of consistent pay for teachers. Their 
complaints of prejudiced decisions gave these correspondents even more revolutionary 
standing than the Committee itself. As Stephen Kotkin has shown by analyzing Soviet 
individuals’ discussion of governmental policies, using the language of the Revolution forced 
the government to at least nominally respond to complaints, lest it look as though it were 
abandoning its principles.157 
Although the inability of the Convention to quell revolts meant that there was room 
for disagreements, these authors nevertheless incorporated the tone and much of the 
vocabulary of the Revolution. The use of revolutionary language represents an internalization 
of new concepts of society and identity, and, as Berger and Luckmann argue, “[t]his 
crystallization is concurrent with the internalization of language.”158 Furthermore, in these 
letters, such discursive assimilation was more notable when the writer was disagreeing with 
the current decisions of the Convention or Committee. This appears to be line with Kotkin’s 
observation that, under Stalinism, “It was not necessary to believe. It was necessary, 
however, to participate as if one believed.”159 Although the Soviet government was already 
established by the time of Kotkin’s analysis (momentarily ignoring the other major 
differences between the two revolutions and governments), the letter writers during the 
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French Revolution seem to have assumed, even in the face of multiple forms of legislative 
assemblies, that the current régime would be long-lived enough to bother ingratiating 
themselves. Either they were committed to the revolutionary cause, or, at the very least, they 
thought it worthwhile to hedge their bets. By couching their criticism and complaints into a 
discussion of the dangers of prejudices, these correspondents recognized the revolutionary 
attempt to alter language and thus made their appeals more acceptable.  
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Chapter III: Recognizing the Danger of “Our Prejudices”  
The educator has the duty of not being neutral. 
-Paulo Freire 
 
Amid the trial of the King, Joseph Serre stated: “Do not therefore accuse men, but 
rather our character, our habits, our prejudices, and our education.”160 In the textbooks and 
pamphlets examined here, the authors took the blame of the Ancien Régime off individuals 
and placed it squarely on prejudices. By explicating the various perils posed by prejudices, 
the authors proved that the Republic would have to be founded on a rigorous educational 
system, which would teach judgment and thereby eradicate prejudices. A critical element in 
the revolutionaries’ quest to found a republican culture was their attempt to create an ideal 
system of public education.161 Through purifying the educational process, these authors 
certainly hoped to prevent internal threats to public safety, but in a way that simultaneously 
encouraged all citizens to become fully rational.  
In order to discourage irrationality, they needed first to discourage the continuation of 
prejudices, which were specifically linked to the Ancien Régime. This obsession with the 
danger of prejudices was not only limited to members of the Committee of Public 
Instruction; it was also central to the public discourse around education during the French 
Revolution. In this context, prejudices embodied the societal past as lingering influences of 
unenlightened worldviews. They were false judgments made by an individual, often by 
uncritically accepting authority as a basis for knowledge. Therefore, the revolutionaries 
labelled many previously accepted societal standards as prejudices. For instance, support for 
a model of education in which few students have access to higher-level instruction was 
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frequently denounced as evidence of a prejudice for hierarchy, as a model based on a belief 
in inherent inequality between individuals.  
To effectively convince the youth to abandon ignorance and prejudices, the 
Committee of Public Instruction announced a contest for new elementary textbooks in Year 
II of the revolutionary calendar (January 1794).162 This contest began barely a month after 
the enactment of the Bouquier Law, which abandoned the previous comprehensive plans for 
public instruction. Henceforth, anybody could become a teacher; they “simply had to receive 
a certificat de civisme and announce their intention to open a school.”163 This law stripped 
the Committee of its control over the structure of the school system or over the training of 
teachers. Therefore, its members sought to exercise influence through textbooks. Their 
contest acknowledged the lack of official structure while still focusing on idealized vision of 
education as replacing prejudices with judgment. Not all of the textbooks examined here 
were written in response to this contest. However, textbooks and pamphlets consistently 
called for the eradication of prejudices even before this contest or before the Reign of Terror. 
Nevertheless, after this announcement, these calls became even more insistent.  
 
Threats to Public Safety 
In both textbooks and pamphlets, prejudices were portrayed as lingering influences of 
the Ancien Régime.164 In a pamphlet, Committee member François-Xavier Lanthenas (1754-
1799), a Girondin who escaped the later purge of the Convention through the influence of 
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Marat and who has been deemed a “quintessential revolutionary idealist,”165 stated that “[t]he 
education which existed under the Ancien Régime […] was calculated […] to entrench 
prejudices.”166 The authors spoke of the Ancien Régime as a superstitious and unequal order 
and starkly contrasted it with the new republic, which was described as a transcendent entity, 
existing in the army’s courage, the will of the people, popular societies, military victories, 
and the hearts of the sans-culottes, the “breech-less” or common members of society. The 
republic was pure because its components had been “cleared of monarchical and religious 
prejudices.”167 Yet this optimistic belief in purity hides the more pervasive fear that 
prejudices were still plaguing the republic; other texts suggest that the revolutionaries 
worried that, without systemic reform, the education system would reproduce prejudices 
rather than discourage them.  
Writing in 1790, Desrasmer, a student at the University of Paris, addressed the 
Committee’s fear that the university system was unable to move past its tradition of the study 
of Catholic theology and was therefore contaminated with prejudices.168 This universal 
religious influence, which was later used to indict the entire education system, 169 was due to 
the fact that the Catholic Church had been the primary provider of education.170 Writing from 
within the university that housed France’s premier theology faculty,171 Desrasmer claimed 
that the University had historically exposed students to the philosophes and had, in fact, 
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nurtured republican ideas – a stance shared even by monarchists before the start of the 
Revolution.172 However, others argued that “those students who were later philosophes or 
revolutionary leaders got most of their ideas from sources outside the schools.”173 Thus the 
Ancien Régime’s educational system could not be credited with the production of “lovers of 
liberty.” By the time of the textbook contest, tolerance for Catholic influence was no longer 
publicly justified. In his Manuel des Instituteurs, Chantreau bemoaned the fact that college-
educated men had a difficult time ignoring their prejudices. Like many other authors, he 
feared that this influence would seep into political decision-making.174  
This fear of contamination fueled much of the discourse over public instruction, and 
prejudices were spoken of as threats to public safety. Like Voltaire before them, the authors 
realized that prejudices typically took root during childhood. Given the revolts in the Vendée 
and the refusal of many priests to swear the oath of allegiance,175 the legislators feared that 
the home environment was too uncontrollable. In the current, impure society, prejudices 
abounded. Plans for public instruction therefore frequently called for mandatory attendance 
or even boarding schools for primary education. The textbook authors thus sought to protect 
the next generation from the corrupting prejudices so as to ensure the future purity of 
society.176 
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This debate, according to Robert Vignery, began a trend of “describing the republic 
as in imminent danger from the forces of reaction and advocating compulsory school 
attendance as an instrument of public safety.”177 Even before the creation of the Committee 
of Public Safety, education was seen as a way to weed out and prevent internal enemies.178 
Teaching could, potentially, identify (and reform) such traitors before they became full-
fledged citizens;179 however, this was not a guarantee, as the Athenians’ refusal to listen to 
Socrates demonstrated. On the other hand, Plato argued in the Republic that the Athenians 
were unable to understand and value Socrates because they lacked a proper education 
system.180 In this understanding, education again regains its central role in society. 
In both the textbooks and pamphlets, prejudices were clearly seen as corrupting vices 
which must be eradicated, and the authors believed that this suppression could best be 
accomplished through a national form of education and instruction. A book of weekly moral 
lessons declared that “prejudices are the tyrants of the soul.”181 Prejudices, under this 
understanding, encouraged one to act and think like a subject to a tyrant. Because the 
acceptance of prejudices meant that one was refusing to reject the knowledge system of 
monarchial tyrants, then one was voluntarily limiting one’s possible responses to situations 
and thus shirking one’s duty as a citizen. Referring back to Kant, the prejudiced individual 
lacked the ability to act or think autonomously. This willing retreat to heteronomy was seen 
as a betrayal of the values of the Revolution.182 
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In the middle of the Revolution, textbook authors blamed the Catholic Church for the 
propagation of atavistic ideas. Early texts, however, often took a moderate stance in which 
they argued that the Church could help with the spread of morals and virtue if it chose to 
abandon most of its doctrine.  Referring back to an argument that Voltaire had made, not all 
of the prejudices instilled by religion were considered wrong. The revolutionaries wanted to 
maintain morality, but in a purified manner. This morality, however, would be ratified by 
judgment and thus not considered prejudice. Nevertheless, the revolutionaries were unclear 
as to how the education system could maintain autonomy while promoting quasi-traditional 
morality. 
 
The Root of Prejudices: Ignorance 
Once the perception of prejudices as threats to public safety had been established, the 
Committee and the textbook authors became increasingly concerned with the belief that most 
people were content with their prejudices and did not wish to discard them for revolutionary 
truth. Because prejudices were based on the acceptance of heteronomous authority, they 
made individuals more liable to manipulation and more resistant to education. According to 
Sophia Rosenfeld, revolutionary pamphlets sought “to articulate what everybody should 
already know from instinct and experience if they were not so blinded by prejudice (meaning 
what had passed for common sense just months earlier in many cases).”183 The classification 
of certain ideas as prejudice changed as rapidly as revolutionary politics. Just as Descartes 
had cast all knowledge into doubt, the Revolution cast all societal practices and belief into 
doubt. These authors, however, argued that providing access to knowledge and emphasizing 
facts would free individuals to judge politics and adapt to the political situation at hand. 
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Even so, the people continued to resist education,184 and the new textbooks were not 
always used outside of Paris.185 Popular resistance to mandatory primary schools, especially 
boarding institutions, was occasionally dismissed as the influence of prejudices. While 
complaining about the persistence of prejudices, Lanthenas stated that “the enemies count on 
the ignorance of the people.”186 Chantreau argued that public instruction had to ensure that 
the future generations would have neither the prejudices of the contemporary one nor the 
inclination to form new ones.187 Prejudices, the authors contended, hindered the formation of 
political compromises. While this reluctance to compromise might protect the purity of the 
republic, it also contributed to delay in the political process. Although the Committee of 
Public Instruction’s devotion to minute details was frequently praised, authors bemoaned the 
fact that such attention led to a delay in actual reform.188 The delay was criticized not only 
for the financial state that it put professors and teachers in,189 but also because it meant that 
prejudices were continuing to propagate unchallenged. In one instance, the distinct lack of 
haste to implement any educational system at all was linked to the influence of prejudices 
within the Committee itself.190 
Rather than viewing the new public instruction system as a creation of a new set of 
prejudices, the citizens’ plans frequently claimed to replace prejudices with knowledge. 
Léonard Bourdon de la Crosnière summed up many authors’ stances when he stated that 
“instruction is the friend and companion of liberty and the most formidable scourge of 
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despotism.”191 By encouraging the acquisition of knowledge, public instruction would give 
students resources to discover truth.192 Pierre-Vincent Chalvet, the author of a report from the 
department of Isère and a professor of history, explained that their library and art museum 
helped considerably with educating the public.193 By highlighting opportunities for self-
instruction, they found that people’s innate curiosity led them down the path of knowledge. 
Chalvet also praised their local newspapers for allowing citizens to follow the news from 
Paris but nevertheless beseeched the national government to enact sterner censorship laws.194 
Since newspapers functioned as a medium of instruction, ensuring their truthfulness was 
essential. In the absence of a common sense derived from truth and knowledge, the 
government, like all citizens, would revert to basing its decisions on prejudices.  
Chalvet’s faith in individuals’ willingness to be educated is crucial, as education 
“depends very much on the mutual desire of the people who are competing to give and 
receive it.”195 Without this reciprocal desire for education, the moral faculties of the students 
will be destroyed by the process of force. Chalvet argued that all men have equal aptitudes 
for morality, but that they must want to be educated to be able to develop their moral 
faculties properly. However, this claim also sheds insight into the agonistic qualities of 
French education. As the eighteenth century progressed, emulation, which had been a key 
figure in French education, ceased to focus solely on imitation and began instead to develop a 
competitive aspect. Through the proliferation of competitive examinations, which were 
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monetarily rewarded, education became increasingly perceived in terms of social utility. Nira 
Kaplan argues that these frequent competitions were seen “as exhibiting a new type of public 
virtue in which the emphasis on heroism and self-sacrifice was replaced by an ideal of social 
utility.”196 During the Revolution, competitions were offered as solutions to the destruction 
of Ancien Régime institutions, even though competitions had thrived under the Ancien 
Régime, particularly among the Academies. The competing plans and even the competition 
for new textbooks illustrated a belief that the public was capable of discerning the best 
solution. This discernment relied heavily on the development of judgment. 
As it emphasizes the development of judgment, education, according to national 
librarian Jean Chevret, “internally enlightens us on justice and injustice, on the nature of vice 
and virtue, which we use to distinguish between truth and error.”197 Nevertheless, since 
education had to be desired in order to be effective, educators during the Revolution had to 
prepare for the possibility of introducing it in a limited form so as to gain societal acceptance. 
If this were to be the case, then it needed to be able to inspire “the spirit of analysis, the 
faculty of reasoning well, the genius of discovery, the talent of expressing oneself eloquently, 
with justice and energy in the popular assemblies, the perception and function of useful 
knowledge, the talent of instructing oneself and listening to others in the sphere of these 
ideas.”198 Practical knowledge was a virtue because it implied a moral decision about the 
goal for such knowledge. In thinking about the uses for practical knowledge, “[t]he 
distinction between what should and should not be done includes the distinction between the 
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proper and improper and thus presumes a moral attitude, which it continues to develop.”199 
Therefore, the emphasis on utility did not negate any moral claims that the revolutionaries 
made. 
 
A Civic Sin 
 Through expounding on the various potential meanings of the term préjugé, the 
textbook authors highlighted the perceived sources of danger to the Revolution. The 
consistent use of this term in these published materials suggests that it became a consciously 
ideological tool in the revolutionary attempt to rework the French language.200 Furthermore, 
the connotations of the term are consistent with its meaning in French Enlightenment 
discourse. Paired with the occasional reference to the philosophes, the usage of this term 
suggests that the revolutionaries were intentionally building upon educated people’s 
understanding of the term. 
By highlighting ignorance as the primary source of prejudices, the authors under 
examination framed them as a fixable problem. Exposure to knowledge – through libraries, 
reliable newspapers, and schools – would enlighten the people and strengthen the Republic. 
This goal was essential to ensure the purity and longevity of the Republic. As Marisa Linton 
has shown throughout her work on the French Revolution, purity and virtue were interwoven 
concepts in revolutionary politics.201 Once prejudices were understood as a civic sin, 
inasmuch as they embodied the source of corruption, their eradication became a necessary 
prerequisite for the possibility of virtuous citizens and politics.  
                                                
199 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. New York: Seabury Press, 1975: 22. 
200 C.f. Sophia Rosenfeld. A Revolution in Language. 
201 C.f. Marisa Linton. The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001. And 
Choosing Terror: Virtue, Friendship, and Authenticity in the French Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
59 
 
Chapter IV: Converting Schools from Prejudice to Judgment 
In order for critical pedagogy, dialogue, and thought to have real effects, they 
must advocate the message that all citizens, old and young, are equally entitled, 
if not equally empowered, to shape the society in which they live.  
-Henry Giroux 
 
 An educational reformer both before and during the Revolution as well as one of the 
Paris electors of 1789, Léonard Bourdon de la Crosnière (1754-1807), summed up the 
general intent of textbook authors by stating that public instruction “must convert schools 
from prejudices, from ignorance, and from servitude into schools in which free, virtuous, and 
enlightened men are formed.”202 The textbook authors, as well as other members of the 
public who published pamphlets analyzing the state of education, sought to enforce this 
conversion, most notably through changes in the curriculum and emphasis on moral 
development. They not only participated in a nation-wide process of defining prejudice as a 
philosophical, moral, and political problem, but they also proposed various reforms to 
excoriate them.  
Through art, memorization of civic texts, or emotional appeals, the authors sought to 
make students interested in questions of morality. These debates over mythology or rhetoric 
shed insight into the political culture endorsed by the authors. The control and concern over 
early reading exercises or the incorporation of art gave some authors the freedom to move 
away from catechisms and to a more engaged learning style. Not only would this moral 
education encourage obedience to laws, as seen through the use of civic catechisms, but it 
would also instill correct judgment. By illustrating the authors’ commitment to cultivating 
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judgment, these curriculum changes are central to understanding their struggles against 
prejudices. 
The Committee members wanted to find long-term solutions to the threat of atavistic 
ideas, and they realized that it was more important to impart the process of judgment rather 
than merely the end goal. Due to the imminent danger, some of the authors, who were often 
prominent revolutionaries, did revert to rote memorization. Nevertheless, whether in 
introductions or footnotes, they explained how they wanted their texts to impact the readers. 
This explication suggests a desire to retain further control over the use of the textbooks. As 
we have already seen, revolutionary legislators worried that people would not understand the 
importance of revolutionary projects. By providing the reasoning behind their proposed 
changes, the authors hoped to make the texts more accessible to the public and thus more 
meaningful. 
 
Curriculum Changes 
 The authors all agreed that the structure of public instruction needed to be optimized 
to encourage reason and judgment. Through suggestions for the order and nature of subjects, 
the authors sought to differentiate their ideas not only from the practices of the Ancien 
Régime, but also from other revolutionary authors and legislators. In Le Manuel des Jeunes 
Républicains, the author argued against teaching mythology, as it will give children “the taint 
of its prejudices.”203 He argued that while some plans called for mythology to be taught 
early, as a way of exposing children to religious plurality,204 it would not give children a 
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consistent conception of republican values and virtues. Furthermore, the author posited that 
the unnecessary emphasis on mythology would pervert children’s tastes and thus their moral 
judgments.205 Building on philosophy’s understanding of the commensuration of political, 
moral, and aesthetic judgments, he argued that exposure to art needed to be strictly controlled 
in order to prevent development of additional prejudices.  
 Conversely, other authors, like Chalvet, advocated for art to be used proactively to 
encourage proper virtue. Pierre-Claude-François Daunou (1761-1840) was central to these 
discussions. He was a former member of the Oratorian teaching order and a Girondist who 
was imprisoned during the purging of the National Convention and who was later central to 
the founding of the Directory. His 1795 plan was the only revolutionary plan to be 
implemented.206 In his textbook, he posited that art could not be separated from education.207 
For Daunou, art’s “supreme utility consists in its forcing individuals to attentively observe 
the forms of nature; art makes one find justice, harmony, and beauty.”208 Likewise, the 
Alphabet républicain’s syllabic essays began with one on the beauty of nature. J.B. Chemin-
Dupontès, the author and official printer for the department of Paris, addressed natural 
phenomenon and concluded by arguing that if one paid attention, then one could not fail to 
notice the order and beauty of the world, which proved the existence of a supreme being.209 
Most other discussions of art, however, tended to limit themselves to advocating for the 
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revolutionary festivals as modes of public instruction.210 These discussions over the utility of 
art illustrate the search for a trustworthy method to combat remnants of the past or immoral 
beliefs. By assuming an inherent moral value in art, the authors posited that it could be used 
as a replacement to religion to instill pure virtues into students. This instruction would ensure 
virtuous, unprejudiced citizens. 
The dangers of art were also elucidated. Traditionally, rhetoric had been taught before 
logic, but Chantreau argued that this sequence was one of the primary causes of prejudices 
because people are easily seduced by the well-spoken. Throughout Western education, 
“[r]hetoric was always in conflict with philosophy and, against the idle speculation of the 
sophists, claimed to teach true wisdom.”211 Building on Plato’s ideas, however, Chantreau 
argued that “the art of rhetoric is doubly dangerous and perfidious.”212 In a political system 
which relied on oratory to convince deputies how to vote, the art of rhetoric could potentially 
be used to argue for the perpetuation of prejudices. Unless its instruction was tied to logic, 
rhetoric could be an irrational force, appealing to the ignorance of the listeners. The question 
of when and how it ought to be taught reflected a concern with the purity of political culture. 
In a pamphlet addressed to parents, Abbé Pierre-Nicolas-Joseph Hazard (1750-1797), 
director of a military school in Nanterre, argued that music could be a danger despite 
reinforcing natural sentiments. If listened to without an understanding of the rules which 
govern it, music could overexcite a sensitive soul and cease to be a moral influence.213 By 
linking criticisms of subjects to fears about political stability, authors were able to justify 
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their concerns in a way that could not be easily dismissed. These authors worried that art was 
not so intrinsically tied to good that it could not be used for counter-revolutionary purposes. 
Art, such as inflammatory rhetoric or music, might be used by prejudiced individuals to 
incite the French people against the Revolution, their reason, and their best interests.  
This emphasis on art’s power, both positive and negative, was not the only 
curriculum change suggested by these authors. They advocated for using instruction in 
reading to double for other instructions. In the eighteenth century, students were commonly 
taught to read through short compositions on general topics in which each word was broken 
into syllables.214 Daunou argued that reading exercises could be used to give lessons in 
natural and civil history, morality, and even to provide a general conception of the new 
political organization.215 These compositions would instruct the students and thus 
immediately dispel ignorance and prejudice while also providing them with the skills to 
examine their remaining prejudices. One of the last essays in the Alphabet républicain 
concerned itself with the nature of government. It stated that a society “where the people are 
sovereign, & where all the citizens are equal, that is to say, all have the same rights, is called 
REPUBLIC. It is the best of all the governments.”216 History was often central to these 
textbooks, as it provided the space for students to contemplate why the revolutionaries had 
chosen a republic. Some of the catechisms had students memorize particular dates of the 
Revolution, such as the storming of the Bastille or the execution of the King.217 Through 
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familiarity with these concrete, historical examples, people would learn to make better 
judgments.  
In Le Premier Livre ou Alphabet du républicain, the author used the Prayer to the 
Supreme Being and the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen as the first reading 
exercises. In a footnote, the author remarked: “We cease to mark the division of words into 
syllables so as to deliver the young student unto the forces which he should have acquired in 
reading what precedes, to the point of knowing it by heart.”218 The author chose the 
Declaration as the first exercise because the students would have to continually practice it 
until they learned to read. At that point, it would have been impressed upon their mind. The 
choice of rights as the most fundamental lesson is meaningful, as “[t]o have human rights, 
people had to be perceived as separate individuals who were capable of exercising 
independent moral judgment.”219 The Declaration both cemented the benefits of the new 
political order and emphasized the importance for the students to develop autonomous 
judgment. Another footnote at the end of the Declaration states that “instructors should not 
neglect to make their young students learn by heart the Declaration of Rights of Man.”220 The 
moral or political nature of these early readings was crucial because it was accepted that not 
all students would be able to continue their education. Therefore, their limited education 
needed to be relevant to their political and social duties. Specifically, it needed to instill in 
students the desire to free themselves from their prejudices and to train them in how to do so. 
These early political readings were not so much political indoctrination as examples of 
proper judgment. Since it had already been established that the source of prejudices was 
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ignorance, young students needed to be given as much information about the nature and goal 
of government as possible in order to make political judgments as future citizens.  
 
Exposure to Political Processes  
 Some textbooks took the mission of preparing students for their political duties more 
seriously than others. Rather than limiting themselves to only discussing the nature of 
government, some textbooks provided models of procès-verbaux, or minutes of 
governmental meetings. An author from Hérault explained that students needed models so 
that political processes could be uniform across the nation. This conformity would allow 
citizens to communicate more clearly with one another.221 Furthermore, he argued that 
people needed to engage in the law-making process even after the Constitution was 
ratified.222 Even authors who did not provide such models praised those schools, such as 
Louis-le-Grand, who integrated instruction about the nature of government and guidance in 
how to participate in it.223 By being exposed early to the structure of political documents, the 
students would have a better ability to grasp governmental affairs.  
Instead of merely advocating for the study of governmental publications as 
preparation for political duties, some pamphlets argued that students needed to be exposed to 
political discourse. They therefore encouraged students to attend popular societies in order to 
complete their education. Assemblies, whether governmental or popular, allowed citizens to 
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engage directly with political debates and to intellectually grapple with the issues of how to 
serve and protect the nation. By engaging with political discussions from an early age, 
students would gain the skills necessary to prevent the republic from degenerating into an 
aristocracy.224 These requirements included rhetoric, to be persuasive members of society, 
and analytic skills to dissect opponents’ arguments. Through attending popular societies, 
students would realize the responsibility of civic judgment. 
Popular societies also combatted ignorance. As previously discussed, the 
revolutionaries believed that giving people access to knowledge would dissuade them from 
their preconceptions by providing an alternative basis for judgment. However, standards for 
judgment could become outdated in a matter of days as previous allies were revealed to be 
counter-revolutionaries.225 This chaos meant that citizens could never assume that their 
beliefs were accurate. Instead, responsible citizens continually had to guarantee that their 
knowledge was correct. Popular societies provided the forum for discourse that could clear 
away lies and confusion; in them, public opinion would crystallize free of the corrupting 
influence of prejudices.226 By linking education to civic obligations, these textbooks provided 
reasons for students to be interested in their lessons.227 
 
Developing the Soul 
 While many revolutionaries had abandoned Catholicism, they nevertheless continued 
to use the language of morals and virtues – and even of souls – when discussing politics and 
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education. In a report to the Parisian Jacobins, Alexandre-François Marie, Vicomte de 
Beauharnais (1760-1794), the revolutionary general who was later executed for poorly 
defending France, claimed that public instruction should be “a natural system of education 
which provokes the development of the faculties of the soul.”228 The Jacobins still 
maintained a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, and that faith, as well as the wish to 
avoid antagonizing the Catholic population, may have been a factor in their choice to use 
religious language. Another crucial factor was judgment’s categorization as a moral 
faculty229; its prominent role in the discourse around education may also have contributed to 
the prevalence of religious undertones. In using moral terms in reference to a secular project, 
the authors examined here revealed their quest to find new transcendent ground for a non-
religious set of morals and ethics. They believed that 
it was important to develop the soul in order for 
individuals to realize why their prejudices ought to 
be abandoned. Through this moral development, 
education held the key to perfecting humanity.230 
One way that the authors sought to excite the 
soul was through sentiments,231 often towards the 
country. Many textbooks listed “love of country” or 
“love of liberty, of equality” as essential republican 
virtues.232 The Alphabet des Sans-culottes, which 
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was structured as a civic catechism, prompted its readers: “Q. What are the sentiments which 
are innate with the soul of a republican? A. The love of liberty, of equality, and the hatred of 
tyrants.”233 Nevertheless, such sentimental pleas were sometimes followed by statements 
about how good intentions are not enough, such as the claim that patriotism “is not always 
enlightened, is not always wise; it can become dangerous in men, in whose homes it creates 
very lively and vicious passions.”234 Similarly, “hatred of tyrants” was frequently 
encouraged. This language recalls another author’s radical claim that “prejudices are tyrants 
of the soul,” and it suggests that hatred of tyrants would compel one to reject all influences of 
prejudices. Although love of country and hatred of tyrants were not seen as solving all 
potential issues, they were seen as virtues and even as “the religion of honest people.”235 
Therefore, according to the authors, lessons designed to teach children love of the nation 
were not any more manipulative than ones that teach them to be honest. Instead, both were 
part of a necessary attempt to “regenerate morals by good public instruction.”236 Under this 
belief, to criticize the inspiration of patriotism was to denounce all encouragement of 
morality. 
It is not incidental that sentiments were linked to morals in education. The Revolution 
was a heavily passionate event, and Robespierre and other politicians relied on sentimental 
appeals.237 Although the Enlightenment praised reason, Hunt shows that eighteenth-century 
educational reformers had also decided that “[t]he passions were good and could be 
mobilized by education for the improvement of humanity.”238 Through its connection to 
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morality, passions became part of judgment, even unconscious judgments. Rather than 
opposing reason and passion, the revolutionaries used the two to bolster morality, which 
Hunt argues “was the education of this sentiment to bring out its social component.”239 
Encouraging sentimentality240 involved the cultivation of judgment. According to Aristotle, 
“judging well” meant “something like having the right feelings for the right reasons.”241 
According to Robert C. Solomon, passions are rational insofar as they are “calculative 
judgments that can be discussed, debated, developed, and further argued, just like the reasons 
and arguments that are advanced concerning more abstract and purely impersonal topics.”242 
Without interest or sentiments, people have little incentive to care about the suffering of 
others or the noble goals of politics, such as equality and liberty. The revolutionaries used 
basic emotions such as love and hatred to make education more meaningful,243 but they also 
used emotional language because it was common during their time period and powerful 
during the Revolution. 
As the Revolution progressed, the plans for public instruction turned more towards 
moral education; instead of dictating every aspect of the curriculum, they “focused on 
directing the child toward civic virtue through manipulation of the sentiments rather than 
pushing him on to study.”244 Moral education would teach children to recognize when their 
heart was properly guiding them and then to obey it.245 This vision of public instruction 
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explains why it was acceptable for the majority of students not to pursue higher education; its 
main purpose was fulfilled once they had accepted their moral and civic obligations. 
However, authors disagreed on how to implement moral education, which was central to the 
French conception of the obligations of public instruction.246 This shift towards emotional 
language was a recognition of the failure of reason in convincing individuals to be virtuous. 
It was common for this moral, emotional education to be suggested as a replacement for 
religious instruction.247 In his Lettre au comité, Mathurin Louis Étienne Sédillez stated that 
moral education was simply supposed to erase differences between morality and laws.248 In 
this understanding, moral education could “inspire feelings of justice and beneficence, social 
morals, and republican virtues in the students.”249 Therefore, as students progressed through 
the public instruction system, they approached both adulthood and citizenship.250  
In his recent book, Adrian Velicu argues that the existence of civic catechisms is 
“evidence of a favourable outlook on the political instruction that excluded questioning and 
critical judgment.”251 Certainly there were catechisms, the very format of which encourages, 
even demands, rote memorization and obedient answers. Nevertheless, the catechisms were 
not the only form of revolutionary textbooks. Other textbook authors explicitly rejected the 
catechism method because they sought to encourage independent judgment. Condorcet 
“disliked the idea of republican catechisms and civic indoctrination […] He expected that 
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with the right knowledge the desired virtues would naturally emerge.”252 The ones who did 
endorse catechisms appeared to do so somewhat reluctantly, after admitting that in a time of 
crisis, it appeared essential to be able to educate as many students at once as possible;253 they 
tended to see public education as essential for a strong republic and catechism as a necessary 
evil in this particular situation. Mass education, the apologists argued, did not give instructors 
enough time to be able to use other alternatives. This understanding operated under the 
mentality that cultivating morality “is the development of something that is given, so that the 
practice and cultivation of it is a mere means to an end.”254 Everyone has an aptitude for 
morality, but they must strive to develop that possibility. Because the process has little effect 
on the use of morality, the process recedes in importance in relation to the end goal. 
According to Mirabeau, “no ideological principle, even one conceived in liberty, could be 
allowed to threaten the political and social gains of the Revolution.”255 Public education was 
essential for a strong republic. However, the mere presence of catechisms does not prove, 
contrary to Velicu’s argument, that revolutionary instruction was primarily dedicated to 
silencing political dissent.  
 
Teaching Good Judgment 
By making rejection of prejudices central to their education system, the 
revolutionaries also made the development of judgment a key goal. In the Enlightenment, 
judgment was defined as a process, which ideally would be the application of rules to 
situations. However, in the chaos of the Revolution, many of those standards had been 
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dismissed as prejudices. Therefore, there was a divide between calls for reflective and 
determinative judgments. In both cases however, judgment was understood to be, according 
to Gadamer, “something that cannot be learned because no demonstration from concepts is 
able to guide the application of rules.”256 Therefore, the revolutionaries had to encourage 
proper judgment in different ways, and they did so by focusing on sensus communis, or 
common sense. Instead of being an intellectual faculty, like judgment, common sense was “a 
sum of judgments and judgmental criteria that determine its contents.”257 These accumulated 
judgments and standards assist in the individual judging process.258 Although the 
revolutionary system of education could not directly teach its students how to judge, it could 
purify the common sense by convincing the population to reject corrupt prejudices. Though 
enlightening these societal standards for future judgments, the revolutionaries hoped to guide 
individuals towards proper judgment. It may seem as though this entire process could be 
summed up by stating that the revolutionaries intended to replace one set of prejudices with 
another. Such an oversimplification would be incredibly misleading. The revolutionaries 
maintained their suspicion of all prejudices and their ability to bypass the judging process. 
However, given their situation – one overwhelmed by threats and besieged by fear – they 
adapted their education project to bring them to a situation in which they could focus purely 
on developing the faculties of judgment. 
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Conclusion: Can Prejudices Be Revolutionary? 
Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. 
-Rosa Luxemburg 
 
In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke attacked the 
revolutionary project to remove all prejudices from society and stated that the revolutionaries 
were rashly constructing “a scheme of society on new principles” and disregarding “the 
judgment of the human race.”259 What the revolutionaries saw as prejudices, Burke saw as 
“common judgment,” and he warned that abandoning it would lead to social chaos, as he saw 
this common judgment to be the result of previous generations’ wise decisions and necessary 
to social stability. Burke took on the almost preposterous position of defending prejudices in 
the face of modernity, and his counterrevolutionary critique would go on to define 
conservatism.260 Burke’s attack linked the goal of the Enlightenment – rejection of tradition 
in favor of autonomous reason – to the plans of the Revolution. In the writings examined 
here, revolutionaries did not view themselves as disregarding human judgment, but rather as 
creating the conditions for the possibility of proper judgment. However, their attempt to 
cultivate judgment relied on labelling deeply-held beliefs of the populace as relics of the past. 
 
The Failure of Revolutionary Education 
An elector of the Estates-General from the Haut-Rhin complained to the Committee 
of Public Instruction in June 1793 that the nation “has had for a long time martial law, and 
we have not yet had a law of public instruction.”261 Despite the repeated importance of public 
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instruction as crucial to public safety, the Committee and Convention failed to implement a 
comprehensive plan. This failure has been lamented by historians ever since and taken at face 
value, used to imply that the entire discourse around public instruction, with perhaps the 
notable exception of the revolutionary festivals, was meaningless. While individuals during 
the Revolution shared this frustration at the lack of tangible results, they nevertheless 
participated in shaping the goals of these proposed projects. The public contributed to the 
Committee’s understanding that the new public instruction system needed to ensure that 
prejudices were not carried on through time. The educational discourse of the French 
Revolution revealed the role of education in supporting a political regime.  
By focusing on the interaction of prominent and everyday revolutionaries within 
educational discourse, I have shown that ordinary people were involved in a process of 
defining and attacking prejudices rather than simply consenting to a definition imposed from 
above. The adoption of revolutionary terms, even when the authors did not agree fully with 
the government’s decisions, may been seen as evidence of a working hegemony – as 
consenting and legitimating the new regime and agreeing to work within it – but, as the 
widespread revolts indicate, that decision was far from universal. Furthermore, the discourse 
of prejudices transcended obvious partisan lines and persisted after 9 Thermidor and 
therefore should be examined as a central tenet of revolutionary thought.    
The revolutionary authors wanted to destroy prejudices, but they did not intend to 
replace them with other ideas so much as with a method – judgment – which would maintain 
the newly achieved purity of society. Isaiah Berlin argues that political philosophers in the 
Enlightenment believed that studying society would result in recognition of natural law, 
which could, as universals, be applied to particular situations. In this way, the validity of 
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political judgment could be guaranteed.262 “However, this approach turned out to explain so 
small a part of the actual behavior of human beings at times when it seemed most in need of 
explanation – during and after the Jacobin Terror.”263 In Berlin’s understanding, bad political 
judgment is being over-scientific; it is relying too heavily on theories and not enough on the 
particulars of the situation. This belief that the particulars are often minimized in 
determinative judgment is supported by Randall Curren’s argument that the modern world “is 
characterized by demanding contexts of judgment in which the coordination of proliferating 
forms of expertise is ever more difficult.”264 Because of this excess of information, 
individuals may be incapable of gathering enough knowledge to make proper judgments. In 
this state of uncertainty, the ability to judge properly on limited evidence becomes essential. 
The French Revolution has often been labelled as the birth of the modernity, and, at least in 
regard to the amount of information suddenly available to the average citizen, this 
characterization seems accurate.  
In their writings, these revolutionary authors criticized prejudices because they 
realized that over-reliance on any kind of outside ideas, even philosophy, could make people 
unable to react quickly to revolutionary change. By instead advocating for the method of 
judgment, the authors were recognizing the need for political flexibility over ideological 
orthodoxy. The targeting of prejudices allowed the authors to support diverse political 
stances while retaining a revolutionary image. Although the language of prejudices could be 
used to attack opponents, it also illustrated their revolutionary commitment and thus gave 
them the freedom to question the Committee’s decisions.  
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Republics do not rely on the obedience of subjects but rather on the active 
participation of citizens, who hold their representatives accountable. This obligation relies on 
an ability to dissent. Jacques Rancière argues that “Disagreement occurs whenever 
contention over what speaking means constitutes the very rationality of the speech 
situation.”265 If people are disagreeing over a question of rationality, then the entire 
legitimacy of communication and even knowledge is being disputed; people are disagreeing 
over what qualifies as valid knowledge, and without that shared base assumption, meaningful 
communication cannot occur. Caroline Weber argues that verbal dissent during the Reign of 
Terror was perceived as potentially more of a threat than foreign armies.266 Her project 
focuses on “the very forms of difference – political, ontological, and linguistic – that 
Robespierre and his acolytes strove to annihilate.”267 However, her statement is both over-
general and over-dramatic. As a specific form of dissent, prejudices did pose an 
epistemological, but not ontological, threat to the French Revolution. However frequent 
whispers of the dangers of prejudices might have been, the revolutionaries typically 
advocated for education and not execution as response. Furthermore, as I have shown, the 
language of prejudices – like most other revolutionary discourses – was not limited to 
Jacobins or Robespierrists. As Gramsci accurately notes, parties rely on the active support of 
the masses and not solely on the leaders. Through discussing prejudices, individuals were 
able to help shape the actions of the Committee and potentially the Convention. In this 
communicative action, they were not following a strict definition of prejudices but rather 
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creating possibilities for further discourse. Prejudices thus held an ambivalent space; they 
represented both the danger and the linguistic possibility of dissent. This mixed meaning 
represented first the ways that the revolutionaries themselves used the term to discredit other 
ideas and second how this usage bolstered their revolutionary status and thus gave them 
greater freedom. 
 
Prejudices, Judgment, and Disagreement 
Throughout the French Revolution and many of the subsequent social revolutions, 
prejudices, in one guise or another, were routinely criticized by the revolutionaries as relics 
of the past. During the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks dismissed them as “birthmarks of 
the old society.”268 It is inherent in revolutionaries to reject the mentalities of the systems 
which they are overthrowing. Nevertheless, the uncompromising rejection of these historic 
thought systems may not be particularly prudent.269 To return to Berlin’s question of the 
flexibility of the revolutionary thought system, I will now examine Hannah Arendt’s theory 
of judgment and its relation to prejudices and political dissent to highlight further and to 
show the continuing relevance of the ambivalent nature of prejudices.  
Unlike the eighteenth-century French philosophes or Kant, Arendt does not 
unconditionally reject prejudices. In her incomplete manuscript Introduction into Politics, 
she recognizes their utility in everyday judgments and discourages societal attempts to 
eradicate them.270 She deviates from philosophical tradition by arguing that “[m]an cannot 
live without prejudices, and not only because no human being’s intelligence or insight would 
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suffice to form an original judgment about everything on which he is asked to pass judgment 
in the course of his life, but also because such a total lack of prejudice would require a 
superhuman alertness.”271 She defends this position by explaining that prejudices function as 
categories by which humans judge. This understanding was shared by the revolutionaries, 
who qualified it by arguing that they were incorrect categories; nevertheless, it was their 
utility which made prejudices so dangerous. In both Arendt and the revolutionary tradition 
analyzed in the introduction, judging is a social activity that helps people to make sense of 
the plurality of the world. 272 Through functioning as the basis of future judgments, 
prejudices support intersubjective communication by allowing individuals to anticipate the 
judgments of others.273 
Furthermore, according to Arendt, every prejudice “always conceals some previously 
formed judgment which originally had its own appropriate and legitimate experimental basis, 
and which evolved into a prejudice only because it was dragged through time without its ever 
being reexamined or revisited.”274 By acknowledging prejudices as previous judgments and 
not mere opinions, Arendt deviates from the Enlightenment tradition. However, she agrees 
that prejudices are mental representations of the past and thus displaced into the present.  
Despite Arendt’s acceptance of societal prejudices, however, she explicitly bans them 
from the political realm. She believes that in politics, prejudices tended to disguise 
themselves as judgments, which posed significant danger, as we cannot function at all 
                                                
271 Arendt. “Introduction into Politics,” 99. 
272 “The domain of action and human capacity to connect thinking and judgment is exercised not only on the 
public sphere, but also in relation to what Arendt calls the ‘common world,’ a shared set of institutions and 
artefacts that constitute the context of human activity and represents the current knowledge of the world.” Lis 
Lange. “Understanding and Action: Thinking with Arendt about Democratic Education.” Perspectives in 
Education, 30(4): 3. 
273 David L. Marshall. “The Origin and Character of Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Judgment.” Political Theory, 
38(3): 367-393. 
274 Arendt, “Introduction,” Promise, 101. 
79 
 
without judgment, in which political thought is essentially based.275 Modernity has created a 
distinction between the social and political that allows Arendt to make that claim.276  
However, for the French Revolution, society was politicized, in large part because of the 
governmental attempts to eradicate prejudices. 
Arendt thinks that political judgment needs to be reflective; it always has to be 
formed without reference to universal standards. Like the revolutionary authors, Arendt 
understands that prejudices are traditional societal standards.277 Because of their ubiquity, 
prejudices can never fully be abolished from society, but they have to be from politics. If 
allowed to influence politics, prejudices will degrade political judgment to solely 
determinative judgments, which merely apply pre-existing universal standards to particular 
situations. This would prevent individuals from properly examining not only the situation at 
hand but also the standards that they are using. This tension between different forms of 
judgment and the subsequent role of prejudices was also visible in Voltaire’s thought as well 
as in the revolutionary discussion over public instruction. 
In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt explicitly links political and 
aesthetic judgments because both are reflective. Building on Kant’s common sense, she 
argues that judgment is formed in an inner dialogue with society. In judging, an individual 
“always reflects upon others and their taste” and “takes their possible judgments into 
account”278 Therefore, “when one judges, one judges as a member of a community.”279 
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Individuals’ judgments are not so much a process of consensus building as a reflection of 
what the general rule ought to be for the whole society.280 Arendt believes that “[t]he power 
of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others.”281 Despite relying on the potential 
for agreement, Arendt’s judgment hardly represents acceptance of a general will mentality. 
Rather, Taste represents an individual conception of a societal common sense,282 as people 
make judgments based on the assumption that others will agree.283  
One of the key features of judgment for Arendt is its reliance on humans’ capacity for 
enlarged mentalities. She argues that “judgment may be one of the fundamental abilities of 
man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in the 
common world.”284 In this enlarged mentality, individuals would imagine political dissent.285 
Therefore, according to David Marshall, Arendt argues that 
judgment assumed that there would be no pre-established consensus in response to 
particular phenomena and that politics is essentially concerned with negotiating 
differences of opinion without presuming either that such differences are merely 
subjective (and therefore baseless, arbitrary, and intractable) or that differences of 
opinion may be resolved through a rational process of verifying and falsifying 
claims.286  
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Without a pre-existing solution, judgment requires that each individual seek to understand 
others’ positions in detail; this interaction with the common sense enhances judgment.287 
This process of discernment prepares the individual for debate rather than encouraging 
conformity. 
However, George Kateb argues that Arendt seeks to aestheticize political judgment, 
which he claims results in a value-less politics, one not connected to truth or morality.288 He 
posits that Arendt’s “[a]estheticized politics is pure politics, politics for the sake of 
politics.”289 Such purposeless politics allows opinion, rather than truth, to be the currency of 
democracy.290 Kateb insists that seeing a connection between the reflective qualities of 
aesthetic and political judgments qualifies as an aestheticization of politics, which is not the 
case.291 He misunderstands Arendt’s reasons for rejecting pre-determined standards as a basis 
for political judgment. When trying to identify the motivation for Eichmann’s actions, Arendt 
writes that  
Eichmann acted fully within the framework of the kind of judgment required of him: 
he acted in accordance with the rule, examined the order issued to him for its 
‘manifest legality,’ namely regularity; he did not have to fall back upon his 
‘conscience,’ since he was not one of those who were unfamiliar with the laws of his 
country.292  
 
Arendt sees judgment based on standards decided by others (a form of heteronomous reason) 
as relinquishing moral responsibility. A sign of true judgment is the ability to disagree with 
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293 
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majority when the majority is wrong. Thus, her vision of judgment is deeply committed to 
preserving the ability to dissent.  
 
Room for Dissent? 
This analysis of Arendt sheds light into the importance of the revolutionaries’ battle 
against prejudices and reveals it to be a matter of exerting control over the accepted forms of 
knowledge. By excluding prejudices, the revolutionary authors excluded real people from 
their new politics. Their idealized goal is understandable. Prejudices prevent this judgment 
making process and do not encourage debate. The French revolutionaries believed, as many 
commentators do today, that ignorance is the source of prejudices. More accurately, though, 
prejudices encourage people to ignore new information, new beliefs, new ideas by 
prioritizing traditional ones. As common societal beliefs, prejudices allow individuals to 
avoid reexamining traditional beliefs and practices, even when those exclude members of 
society. Prejudices create an illusion of a unified society and people; this vision is intimately 
linked to why societies cannot achieve true self-governance but instead frequently fall prey to 
populist movements. Arendt therefore correctly identified prejudices as a threat to politics, 
but I argue that the language of prejudices itself creates the opportunity for individuals to 
circumvent political discussion. 
The ubiquitous use of the term prejudice labels the Other’s knowledge as irrational 
and invalid and thus precludes the possibility for discussion between opposing sides. 
Prejudices functioned as a derogatory term used to dismiss others’ ideas on a philosophical 
premise so as to avoid the necessity of having to engage in them. Since prejudices are always 
already a danger to society, labelling various beliefs as prejudices served as a way to 
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discredit undesired dissent. Words today that carry the connotation of prejudice (racist, 
sexist, homophobic, etc.) also silence discussion. By not allowing for free political dialogue, 
individuals limit their perceived realm of possibilities for political decisions. Rancière argues 
that “[t]o lose sight of the double specificity of political ‘dialogue’ is to lock oneself into 
false alternatives requiring a choice between the enlightenment of rational communication 
and the murkiness of inherent violence or irreducible violence.”293 Furthermore, these 
pejorative terms marginalize individuals who hold these beliefs and cut them off from the 
allegedly real people of the nation. This vision of a unified people may give further support 
for the revolutionaries or enlightened members of society, but it hides significantly different 
visions for society. For a democracy or republic to be committed to the values of good 
judgment, it must accept the possibilities for dissent embodied in prejudices.  
Debate, not conformity, is the ideal. 
  
                                                
293 Rancière, Disagreement, 43. 
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Appendix 1: French Revolution Timeline 
July 5, 1788 – Announcement of the convening of the Estates-General; suspension of 
censorship 
December 27, 1788 – Council doubled number of delegates from Third Estate 
January – April 1788 – Election of deputies 
May 5, 1789 – Estates-General convened 
June 17, 1789 – Third Estate declared itself the National Assembly 
June 20, 1789 – Tennis Court Oath 
July 14, 1789 – Storming of the Bastille 
August 4-11, 1789 – Abolition of feudalism  
August 26, 1789 – Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen 
October 5-6, 1789 – Women and National Guard forced King and National Assembly to 
move to Paris 
November 2, 1789 – Nationalization of Church property 
July 12, 1790 – Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
July 14, 1790 – Festival of the Federation 
June 2, 1791 – Louis XVI flees Paris 
October 1, 1791 – First Session of the Legislative Assembly 
October 30, 1791 – First meeting of the Committee of Public Instruction 
April 20, 1792 – France declared war on Austria; Condorcet plan presented 
August 10, 1792 – Mobs swarmed Tuileries; monarchy suspended; call for the election of the 
National Convention 
September 2-5, 1792 – September Massacres 
September 19, 1792 – Last meeting of the First Committee of Public Instruction 
September 20, 1792 – National Convention opened 
September 22, 1792 – Republic declared 
October 15, 1792 – First meeting of the Second Committee of Public Instruction 
December 18, 1792 – Lanthenas report 
December 20, 1792 – Romme report 
January 21, 1793 – King executed 
March 11, 1793 – Revolts in Vendée began 
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May 31-June 2, 1793 – Purge of the Girondins 
June 26, 1793 – Sieyès-Daunou-Lakanal report 
September 5, 1793 – Terror declared 
September 17, 1793 – Law of Suspects passed 
October 5, 1793 – Revolutionary calendar adopted, begins retroactively on the first day of the 
Republic 
October 20, 1793 – Romme’s report 
December 19, 1793 – Bouquier Law passed 
April 6, 1794 – Execution of Indulgents 
June 8, 1794 – Festival of the Supreme Being 
July 27, 1794 – Robespierre arrest (9 thermidor II) 
April 1, 1795 – Sans-culottes invade National Convention 
March 20, 1795 – Last meeting of the Committee of Public Safety 
October 5, 1795 – First Directory  
October 25, 1795 – Daunou Law passed 
September 4, 1797 – Second Directory 
October 17, 1797 – Napoleon’s treaty with Austria 
November 9, 1799 – Sieyès and Napoleon overthrow Directory 
December 13, 1799 – Napoleon made First Consul 
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Appendix II: The Committee of Public Instruction294 
In 1791, the first Committee of Public Instruction was established under the 
Legislative Assembly. The French Constitution required a national system of public 
instruction, but the assemblies had not adopted the plans already proposed. When the 
National Convention replaced the Legislative Assembly in 1792, it also created a Committee 
of Public Instruction. In July 1793, Robespierre created a Commission of Public Instruction 
as a sub-committee to the Committee of Public Safety because he felt that the original 
committee was not invested enough in the goals of the Revolution. He hoped that the smaller 
body would be more efficient in passing and enforcing educational legislation. Throughout 
its history, the Committees and Commission’s primary mission was to establish a national 
system of education.  
These committees and commission were made up of deputies, and they met at least 
twice a week but frequently every day. The minutes for these meetings listed the 
responsibilities of each member for the next week and contained reports on duties. The 
Committee regularly presented its progress to the legislator. The two committees were 
broken down into sub-committees, responsible for research of education systems, 
correspondence duties by region or type. They debated every possible aspect of education, 
such as how many schools there should be per number of students, beginning age of students, 
the pay of teachers, and surveillance methods. They passed several decrees. They confiscated 
books of the aristocracy for the new National Library and tried to stop the public from 
                                                
294 Unless otherwise noted, information for this appendix comes from Guillaume, Procès-verbaux du Comité 
d'Instruction publique de l'Assemblée législative and Comité d'instruction publique. Procès-verbaux du Comité 
d'Instruction publique de la Convention Nationale, Tomes 1-5.  
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vandalizing cathedrals and other cultural relics. Most of their work was relatively ignored by 
the Legislative Assembly and National Convention.295 
The members’ political affiliations varied significantly; for instance, several members 
had voted to acquit the King. Some members were imprisoned during the Terror or after 
Thermidor but were ultimately released. Quite a number of the members had been affiliated 
with teaching orders before the Revolution and thus had direct teaching experience; all of 
these members took the oath of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. All three of these bodies 
produced, analyzed, and recommended plans for public instruction systems, but they also 
engaged in other forms of didactic politics. Playing cards were redesigned with workers and 
representations of liberty and equality in place of the monarchy. The Committees are 
responsible for the creation of the metric system, the new republican calendar, and the 
renaming of streets and locations in France. They organized public festivals, commissioned 
artworks, and oversaw changes to the French language.296 One of their projects was the 
establishment of libraries and museums throughout France. 
 
  
                                                
295 Palmer, Improvement of Humanity, 123. 
296 C.f. Mona Ozouf. Festivals and the French Revolution. Alan Sheridan, Trans. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991. 
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Legislative Assembly’s Committee of Public Instruction Members: 
Lacepède 
Condorcet 
Cerutti (left Feb 1792, replaced by Theule) 
Arbogast 
Vienot-Vaublanc 
Gentil 
Pastoret 
Romme 
Vayron 
Rous-Rasillac 
Riboud 
Carnot ainé 
Prieur 
Dupin 
Audrein 
Jean De Bry (left March 1792, replaced by 
Baudin) 
Quatemère 
Gibergues 
Gausserand 
Bonnier 
Gaudin 
Quatresols-Marolles 
Guilloud 
Urbain Chappe
 
National Convention’s Committee of Public Instruction Members: 
Barthelémy Albouys 
Charles-Jean Alquier (from Vendée) 
Louis-Francois-Antoine Arbogast297  
Edme-Louis-Barthélemi Bailly 
Jean-Henry Bancal des Issauds 
Jean-François Barailon 
Claude Basire 
Jean Bassal 
Pierre-Charles-Louis Baudin 
Léonard Bourdon de la Crosnière  
Laurent-Martial-Stanislas Boutroue 
Léonard Buzot 
Pierre-Jacques-Michel Chasles 
Charles-Antoine Chasset 
Marie-Joseph de Chénier 
Jacques-Bernardin Colaud de la Salcette 
Marquis de Condorcet 
Jacques-Michel Coupé 
Pierre-Claude-François Daunou 
Jacques-Louis David 
Charles-François Dupuis  
Pierre-Toussaint Durand de Maillane 
Jean Dusaulx 
Charles Duval 
                                                
297 He is primarily responsible for the emphasis that 
the Committee placed on textbooks. Barnard, 
Education and the French Revolution, 108. 
Claude-Joseph Ferry 
Joseph Fouché 
Henri Grégoire 
Jean-François-Auguste Izoard 
Jean Julien 
Joseph Lakanal 
Jean-Denis Lanjuinais 
François Lathenas 
Joseph-Marie-Philippe Martinel 
Louis-Sébastien Mercier 
Michel-Edme Petit 
Claude-Antoine Prieur-Duvernois 
Charles-Gilbert Romme 
Pierre Roux de Fazillac 
Antoine-François Sergent 
Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès 
Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau
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Commission of Public Instruction Members 
Phillipe Rühl 
Joseph Lakanal 
Henri Grégoire 
Jacques-Michel Coupé 
Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just (served one week, replaced by Robespierre) 
Jeanbon Saint-André (served one week, replaced by Bourdon de la Crosnière) 
 
 
Educational Plans298 
1791 
Mirabeau’s Project: primary education fee-based, allowed independent schools, National 
Lycee at head 
Taylleyrand’s report: free, allowed independent schools, controlled by legislature  
1792 
Condorcet’s project: free, addressed female education, hierarchical and controlled by 
hierarchal administration 
Lanthenas’ project: focused on primary schools, called teachers instituteurs and forbade 
priests from teaching, communes responsible for funding 
Romme’s project: free, hierarchal, promoted academic freedom, never debated 
1793 
Sieyès-Daunou-Lakanal report: primary co-education, standard salaries for teachers, Central 
Commission of Public Instruction would oversee local inspection bureaus, allowed 
independent schools under the surveillance of the Commission, only private higher 
education, emphasized festivals 
Lepelletier’s scheme: boarding schools starting from age 5 for both genders, state controlled 
Romme’s report: advocated for the suppression of all existing educational institutions, 
primary state, co-educational schools 
Bouquier’s law: free, independent education, state textbooks, teachers monitored through 
certificats de civisme, considered higher education aristocratic 
1795 
Daunou Law: fee-based, state-subsided, allowed independent schools, National Institute, 
central schools in every department, special schools for deaf and blind 
 
 
  
                                                
298 Barnard, Education and the French Revolution, 247-251. 
